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Domestic court decisions often make headlines around the world.  For example, recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions about the International Court of Justice and the rights of 
foreign detainees held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay have attracted international 
attention.  However, the role of domestic courts in the world extends far beyond headlines.  
Seemingly routine decisions on issues such as personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, 
choice of law, extraterritoriality, and arbitration have implications for global governance.  Legal 
scholarship divides these issues into doctrinal categories like civil procedure, conflict of laws, 
and international law.  But by doing so, it misses the bigger picture:  for better or worse, 
domestic courts are pervasively involved in regulating transnational activity. 
This Article cuts across doctrinal categories to provide a systematic analysis of the global 
impact of domestic courts.  It argues that domestic courts perform two global governance 
functions:  they allocate governance authority, and they determine rights and obligations of 
transnational actors.  It shows that these functions matter not only for litigants, but also for 
global welfare.  And it proposes a method to critically evaluate these functions that moves 
beyond traditional litigant-focused assessments to analysis of the cross-border effects of 
domestic court decisions.  This method will allow scholars and policy makers to develop the 
empirical foundations needed for the intensifying debate over the proper role of domestic courts 
in addressing global challenges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Domestic court decisions are often world news.  The United 
States Supreme Court decides that a judgment of the International 
Court of Justice is not binding domestic law, as it did in Medellin v. 
Texas;1 or it decides that noncitizen detainees held by the United States 
at Guantanamo Bay have rights under the United States Constitution, 
as it did in Boumediene v. Bush;2 and the world pays attention.3  But 
the role of domestic courts in the world extends far beyond headline-
catching decisions like these.  Domestic courts routinely make 
decisions with cross-border implications.  Common decisions on 
issues ranging from personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, lis 
pendens stays, and antisuit injunctions, to choice of law, 
extraterritoriality, arbitration, foreign judgments, and treaties all have 
implications for global governance.4 
 Legal scholarship separates issues like these into doctrinal 
categories, such as civil procedure, international law, conflict of laws, 
foreign relations law, and arbitration law.5  But by doing so, it misses 
the bigger picture:  for better or worse, domestic courts are pervasively 
involved in the regulation of transnational activity. 
                                                 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 2. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Corine Lesnes, Les juges réaffirment le droit des prisonniers à se 
défendre devant la justice civile fédérale, LE MONDE, June 14, 2008, at 4 (reporting United 
States Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush); Tim Reid, Guantanamo Trials 
in Disarray After Court Ruling, TIMES (London), June 13, 2008, at 40 (same); Patti Waldmeir, 
Top U.S. Court at Odds with Bush over His Powers, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at 9 (reporting 
United States Supreme Court decision in Medellin v. Texas). 
 4. See infra Parts II.A., III.C. 
 5. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  COMMENTARY & MATERIALS chs. 4-5 (1994) (covering enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards); CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS chs. 6-8 (2d ed. 2006) (covering 
extraterritoriality and domestic effect of international law); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 3 (4th ed. 2005) (covering personal jurisdiction and forum non 
conveniens); MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 5 (5th ed. 2008) (covering 
international court judgments); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS chs. 2, 24 (4th 
ed. 2004) (covering international choice of law and foreign judgments). 
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 This Article cuts across doctrinal categories to provide a 
systematic analysis of the global governance functions of domestic 
courts.6  By doing so, it builds on existing legal and political science 
scholarship on domestic judicial governance and judicialization.  This 
scholarship has made a rich contribution to our understanding of the 
role of domestic courts in domestic governance.7  So far, however, 
                                                 
 6. For a preliminary attempt at such an analysis, see Christopher A. Whytock, 
Domestic Courts and Global Governance:  The Politics of Private International Law ch. 1 
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University), available at http://dukespace. 
lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/452 [hereinafter Whytock, Domestic Courts] (developing 
concept of “transnational judicial governance” to describe the role of domestic courts in 
global governance).  Several other bodies of prior scholarship are also relevant.  For example, 
prior scholarship has analyzed the global governance implications of specific types of 
domestic court decision making.  See, e.g., Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders:  
Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT’L ORG. 459 
(2009) (analyzing extraterritorial application of domestic law); Christopher A. Whytock, 
Myth of Mess?  International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719 (2009) 
[hereinafter Whytock, Myth of Mess] (analyzing international choice of law decision 
making).  Prior scholarship has also discussed the governance implications of specific types 
of litigation in domestic courts.  See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory 
Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 315 (2006) (analyzing transnational regulatory litigation); Shi-
Ling Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary Harm:  International 
Environmental Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2007) (analyzing transnational environmental litigation); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational 
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) (analyzing transnational public law 
litigation); Robert Wai, Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance, in 
CRITICIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 243 (Markus Lederer & Philipp S. Müller eds., 2005) 
(analyzing transnational private litigation).  Additionally, there is existing research on 
transgovernmental networks of judges.  See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD 
ORDER ch. 2 (2004) (documenting transgovernmental networks of judges).  Recent 
scholarship also draws attention to the role of domestic courts in promoting the democratic 
accountability of states and international organizations in global governance.  See Eyal 
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Toward Global Checks and Balances, 20 CONST. POL. ECON. 
366, 385 (2009) (“[D]omestic courts are becoming crucial players whose input indirectly 
improves the accountability and hence legitimacy of intergovernmental action, and thereby 
contribute to the evolution of more democratic forms of international cooperation.”).  Lastly, 
prior scholarship has focused on the contributions of domestic courts to the international 
legal order.  See, e.g., BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF 
DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (René Provost trans., 1993) (analyzing contributions of domestic 
courts to international legal order); RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964) (same); Friedrich Kratochwil, The Role of Domestic 
Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 236 (Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil & Saul H. Mendlovitz 
eds., 1985) (same); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 429 (2003) (same). 
 7. Examples of scholarship on the role of domestic courts in domestic governance 
include RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY:  THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS:  A COMPARATIVE AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION (2002); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & 
Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The 
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scholars have devoted relatively little attention to “transnational 
judicial governance”—that is, the role of domestic courts in global 
governance.8  This Article seeks to make a contribution by 
demonstrating the importance of this neglected dimension of judicial 
governance and by providing a framework for understanding it.9 
 Part II of this Article begins by presenting a functional account of 
domestic courts as global governors.10  At first it may seem 
counterintuitive that domestic legal institutions play an important role 
in global governance.11  But as Part II demonstrates, domestic courts 
provide support for transnational activity by performing two global 
governance functions:  they allocate global governance authority (a 
jurisdictional function), and they determine rights and obligations of 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).  In addition, legal 
scholars and political scientists are increasingly studying the role of international courts in 
global governance.  See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN 
LAW:  THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 219-20 (2001) (analyzing 
role of European Court of Justice in European governance); COURTS CROSSING BORDERS:  
BLURRING THE LINES OF SOVEREIGNTY (Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack, Jr., eds., 2005) 
(studying generally the role of international courts in world politics); Wayne Sandholtz & 
Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and International Governance, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (analyzing global governance 
implications of World Trade Organization and European Court of Justice). 
 8. See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 6, at 7 (defining “transnational 
judicial governance as the governance of transnational activity by domestic courts” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 9. For examples of scholarship focused on specific instances of what this Article 
calls transnational judicial governance, see the works cited supra note 6.  Although the Article 
primarily uses examples from the U.S. federal courts (and, to a lesser extent, the European 
legal system), the goal is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the global 
impact of domestic courts in general. 
 10. See Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore & Susan K. Snell, Who Governs the 
Globe? 1 (2008) (manuscript at 1, on file with author) (“[G]lobal governors are actors who 
exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy . . . .  Governors thus:  create 
issues, set agendas, establish and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or 
adjudicate outcomes.”). 
 11. “Global governance” refers to the process of guiding and restraining transnational 
activity.  See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED 
WORLD 202, 245-46 (2002) (defining governance as “the processes and institutions, both 
formal and informal, that guide and restrain . . . collective activit[y]”).  This Article uses the 
adjective “transnational” to refer to activity (such as litigating, disputing, bargaining, 
contracting) having connections to more than one state and to actors engaged in such activity.  
The connections may be territorial when the activity or its effects touch the territory of more 
than one state, or they may be based on legal relationships between a state and the actors 
engaged in or affected by that activity, such as nationality.  Whereas the term “international” 
refers to activity and institutions involving only states, the more general term “transnational” 
refers not only to international activity, but also to activity involving nonstate actors.  See 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics:  An 
Introduction, 25 INT’L ORG. 329, 329-32 (1971) (explaining meaning of “international” and 
“transnational”). 
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transnational actors (a substantive function).  These functions 
correspond to two fundamental questions of global governance.  
Jurisdictionally, the question is:  Who governs?  For example, should 
transnational activity be governed by U.S. law or the law of a foreign 
state with connections to that activity?12  Should a U.S. court or a 
foreign court adjudicate disputes arising from that activity?  
Alternatively, is there an international or private institution that should 
govern the activity? Domestic courts help answer the “who governs” 
question by allocating governance authority among states, between 
domestic and international institutions, and between public and private 
institutions.  Substantively, the question is:  Who gets what?  For 
example, who is entitled to what benefits under disputed transnational 
contracts?  Who is obligated to bear the costs of negative externalities 
resulting from transnational activity, ranging from personal injuries to 
cross-border environmental harm? Domestic courts help answer the 
“who gets what” question by determining rights and obligations of 
transnational actors.13 
 Part III shows that the global governance functions of domestic 
courts matter not only because of their direct impact on litigants, but 
also—and perhaps even more importantly—because of their influence 
beyond borders and beyond the parties to particular lawsuits.  
Domestic court decisions affect the behavior of transnational actors, 
including strategic behavior such as transnational bargaining and 
forum shopping.  These decisions can either increase or reduce global 
economic welfare.  They also can either foster or hinder the 
effectiveness of international institutions, such as international law and 
international courts, and private institutions, such as transnational 
contracting and transnational arbitration.  These broader effects are 
part of what this Article refers to as the “transnational shadow of the 
law.”14  These effects suggest that domestic courts play an important 
                                                 
 12. This Article uses the term “state” in the international legal sense, that is, to refer 
to a “country” such as the United States or Kenya rather than a U.S. state such as California 
or Utah.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 
(1987) (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has 
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”); BARRY E. CARTER, 
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 444 (5th ed. 2007) (“A ‘state’ 
in international law is what we often refer to as a nation or country (such as the United States 
of America or Japan) and is not one of the 50 U.S. states (such as California).”). 
 13. By answering the “who governs” question, domestic courts determine who 
should answer the “who gets what” question. 
 14. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law:  The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951, 972-73 (1979) (describing the “shadow of 
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role in global governance.  At the very least, the effectiveness of 
alternative governance arrangements like international institutions and 
transnational private institutions depends significantly on the support 
of domestic courts.  Transnational judicial governance, which is so far 
only on the margins of global governance scholarship, therefore 
deserves close attention along with international forms of global 
governance (such as international law and international courts) and 
private forms of global governance (such as transnational arbitration). 
 Part IV proposes a method for descriptive, positive-theoretical, 
and normative analysis of the contributions of domestic courts to 
global governance.  The method—which this Article calls 
“governance-oriented analysis”—has two basic characteristics.  First, it 
combines analysis of transnational legal doctrine with analysis of 
transnational law in action:  that is, it focuses on how domestic courts 
actually apply legal doctrine to allocate governance authority and 
determine the rights and obligations of transnational actors.15  Second, 
it moves beyond traditional litigant-oriented perspectives in order to 
improve understanding of the transnational shadow of the law:  that is, 
it focuses on the border-crossing impact of domestic court decisions 
on the behavior of transnational actors, on global economic welfare, 
and on the effectiveness of international and private governance 
institutions.  By using this method, scholars and policy makers can 
begin developing the empirical foundations needed for the intensifying 
debate about the appropriate role of domestic courts in addressing 
global challenges.16 
                                                                                                             
the law” concept in domestic context); see also Martin Shapiro, Courts, in 5 HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE:  GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 321, 329 (Fred I. 
Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975) (“[L]egalized bargaining under the shadow 
supervision of an available court . . . is not purely mediatory, because the bargain struck will 
depend in part on the ‘legal’ strength of the parties, that is, predictions of how each would 
fare in court.”); Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 6, at 24 (describing the “transnational 
shadow of domestic law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 15. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (defining “transnational law” 
as including law “which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. 
L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) (distinguishing between “law in books” and “law in action”). 
 16. Compare Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 316 (arguing that under proper 
circumstances, domestic courts can help “implement[] effective regulatory strategies for 
global markets”), and Wai, supra note 6, at 244 (arguing that domestic courts could be “part 
of a plural regime for the governance of transnational economic activity”), with Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 457-58, 
460 (2001) (arguing that international human rights litigation in U.S. courts creates 
significant costs for U.S. foreign relations, U.S. democracy, and the international system), and 
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs:  A Functional Approach to the 
Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 181 (2004) (arguing that federal courts suffer 
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 In highlighting the role of domestic courts, this Article does not 
intend to downplay the role of other actors in global governance.  To 
the contrary, it emphasizes that a wide variety of institutions—
domestic and international, public and private, formal and informal—
make critical contributions to global governance.17  Ultimately it is 
more important to understand the relationships between these different 
forms of global governance, and which are most appropriate in 
different circumstances, than to establish which form is dominant. 
II. THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS OF DOMESTIC COURTS 
 Among the myriad disputes that flow into the domestic courts of 
the world’s states are disputes arising from transnational activity.  
Judicial workload data shows that transnational litigation constitutes an 
important part of the docket of the U.S. district courts.18  And although 
the worldwide volume of transnational litigation in domestic courts is 
difficult to estimate, legal scholars speculate that globalization and the 
intensifying transnational interactions it entails have caused 
transnational litigation to grow in recent decades.19 
 Transnational litigation in domestic courts raises legal issues 
ranging from personal and subject matter jurisdiction to forum non 
conveniens and international comity, from foreign sovereign immunity 
and the act of state doctrine to lis pendens stays and antisuit 
injunctions, from prescriptive jurisdiction and choice of law to the 
enforceability of forum selection and arbitration agreements, and from 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral 
                                                                                                             
“significant disadvantages” compared to other institutions in the development and 
enforcement of customary international law). 
 17. See infra Part III.C. 
 18. This data includes the number of lawsuits over which U.S. district courts have 
alienage jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute is between “citizens 
of a [U.S.] State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).  
Analyzing data collected by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Kevin 
Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg find that since 1986, well over 120,000 alienage cases 
terminated in the U.S. federal district courts, and that in 2005 alone 1,976 such cases 
terminated.  Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. 
Courts?  Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 462 (2007).  This data 
likely underestimates the total volume of transnational litigation in the United States.  
Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 
18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 449, 457-69 (2008). 
 19. See, e.g., Paul R. Dubinsky, Is International Litigation a Field?  Two Views of the 
Border, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 365, 366 (2007) (describing growth of transnational 
litigation); Martinez, supra note 6, at 441-42 (same). 
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awards to the domestic effect of treaties.20  Legal scholarship organizes 
these issues into diverse doctrinal categories such as civil procedure, 
conflict of laws, arbitration law, international law, and foreign relations 
law.21 
 But behind this doctrinal complexity lie two basic global 
governance functions that domestic courts perform when they make 
decisions in transnational litigation:  they allocate governance 
authority among states, between domestic and international institu-
tions, and between public and private institutions (a jurisdictional 
function); and they determine rights and obligations of transnational 
actors (a substantive function).22  These functions correspond to two 
fundamental questions of global governance:  Who governs?  And who 
gets what?  In this sense, domestic courts are global governors.23 
 This Part explains the global governance functions of domestic 
courts and demonstrates the support that domestic courts can provide 
for transnational activity.  The result is a simple functional map of 
transnational litigation that puts into relief the contributions of 
domestic courts to global governance, contributions that a purely 
doctrinal perspective obscures. 
A. Who Governs?  Judicial Allocation of Global Governance 
Authority 
 The first fundamental question of global governance is:  Who 
governs?24  That is, who has the authority to govern particular 
                                                 
 20. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS (4th ed. 2007). 
 21. See sources cited supra note 5 (giving examples of doctrinal categorization).  
Some of the topics covered by transnational litigation, civil procedure, foreign relations law, 
conflict of laws, and international law are sometimes brought together under the heading of 
“transnational law.”  See, e.g., JESSUP, supra note 15 (defining “transnational law” as 
including law “which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 22. Although the substantive and jurisdictional functions are different conceptually, 
jurisdictional issues can, of course, affect substantive litigation outcomes. 
 23. See AVANT ET AL., supra note 10 (manuscript at 1) (defining concept of “global 
governors”). 
 24. Miles Kahler, Global Governance Redefined 3, 6 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://irpshome.ucsd.edu/assets/014/6742.pdf; see also DANIEL W. 
DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL:  EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 6 
(2007) (explaining the importance of “who makes [the rules]” in transnational regulation); 
Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who Governs?, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 287 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001) (asking “who 
governs,” and distinguishing governance by international, transgovernmental, and private 
entities).  The “who governs” question was first prominently asked in the context of domestic 
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transnational activity?  Domestic courts help answer the “who 
governs” question by allocating governance authority.  This is the 
jurisdictional global governance function of domestic courts. 
 In the language of international law, three types of governance 
authority are at stake:  adjudicative authority, the authority to interpret 
and apply rules; prescriptive authority, the authority to prescribe rules; 
and enforcement authority, the authority to enforce rules.25  But as this 
Part explains, whereas international law traditionally contemplates 
only states as capable of possessing these types of authority,26 domestic 
courts help allocate governance authority not only among states, but 
also between domestic and international institutions and between 
public and private institutions. 
 Thus, domestic courts answer three variants of the fundamental 
“who governs” question:  Who adjudicates?  Who prescribes? And 
who enforces?  And they do so along three dimensions:  domestic-
foreign, domestic-international, and public-private.  This Subpart 
illustrates how domestic courts help answer these different forms of 
the “who governs” question, thus performing an important juris-
dictional function in global governance.27 
1. Allocation of Governance Authority Among States 
 First, domestic courts help allocate governance authority among 
states.  To consider this dimension of judicial allocation of governance 
authority, imagine a hypothetical dispute between AmeriCo, a U.S. 
corporation, and RuriCo, a Ruritanian corporation, arising out of 
transnational activity with connections to both the United States and 
                                                                                                             
politics by Robert Dahl.  ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?  DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN 
AMERICAN CITY (1961). 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 401 (1987).  These three types of governance authority correspond approximately to the 
three traditional questions of conflict of laws:  “Where can the parties resolve a dispute . . . ?”  
What law applies?  What is the effect of a resulting judgment? RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (5th ed. 2006).  For ease of exposition, I discuss 
the three types of governance authority in the order in which they are typically addressed by 
judges and litigants (adjudicative, prescriptive, enforcement) rather than the order in which 
they are traditionally discussed in international law (prescriptive, adjudicative, enforcement). 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 401 introductory note (referring to the authority of a state to prescribe, adjudicate, and 
enforce). 
 27. Cf. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 
162 (2002) (referring to the “structural rules of transnational law,” defined as “rules 
concerning prescriptive jurisdiction, judicial jurisdiction, and the enforcement of judgments 
that together determine the effectiveness of transnational regulation” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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Ruritania.  Suppose further that AmeriCo sues RuriCo in a U.S. federal 
court. 
a. Adjudicative Authority 
 A variety of decisions by the U.S. court can influence whether the 
U.S. court or a Ruritanian court will assert adjudicative authority over 
the dispute.  Some of these decisions are unilateral in the sense that 
they determine whether the U.S. court has authority or not.  Such 
decisions are made without regard to whether a Ruritanian court may 
also have authority and, if so, whether assertion of that authority by 
Ruritania would be more appropriate than the assertion of U.S. 
authority.28  For example, by deciding that it has personal jurisdiction 
and subject matter jurisdiction, a U.S. court establishes the grounds 
upon which it can assert adjudicative authority.29  By deciding that it 
lacks either type of jurisdiction, the U.S. court declines to assert 
adjudicative authority, and the case will be dismissed.30  Similarly, a 
U.S. court may decline to exercise adjudicative authority over trans-
national activity based on theories of foreign sovereign immunity31 or 
the political question doctrine,32 again without consideration of 
                                                 
 28. See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 
1031-32 (2006) (defining unilateral theories of jurisdiction as those that “determine whether 
the courts of a state have jurisdiction or not, regardless of whether the courts of other states 
also have jurisdiction”); see also id. at 1027 (noting that unilateral decisions are made “in 
disregard of potential claims of other legal systems”). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) provides for motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
over the defendant (that is, for lack of personal jurisdiction), and FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) 
provides for motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  A defendant may also 
seek to transfer the case to another forum within the United States under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 
1406 (2006). 
 30. The Supreme Court has implied that courts should pay some attention to 
multilateral concerns when determining whether to assert personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (stating that the 
reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction will depend, among other things, on “the 
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; 
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies”).  But, as Ralf Michaels argues, “[m]ultilateral effects of allocation of jurisdiction 
are not prime goals but mere reflective consequences of unilateral considerations.  They are 
subsumed . . . .”  Michaels, supra note 28, at 1033-34.  Of course, a decision that a U.S. 
federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction does not necessarily preclude subject matter 
jurisdiction in a U.S. state court.  Moreover, a decision that a court in a particular U.S. state 
lacks personal jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that personal jurisdiction cannot lie in a 
court in another U.S. state. 
 31. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, foreign states are immune 
from suit in U.S. state and federal courts unless the relevant court determines that an 
exception specified in the Act applies.  28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
 32. Under the political question doctrine, a court may dismiss a lawsuit if the court 
determines that it poses a nonjusticiable political question.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
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whether it would be appropriate for a Ruritanian court to assert its own 
adjudicative authority.33  But unilateral decisions only provide a partial 
answer to the “who adjudicates” question.  If the court decides not to 
assert adjudicative authority, the question remains:  If not the United 
States, then which state’s courts should assert adjudicative authority? 
 Other U.S. court decisions are multilateral in the sense that they 
explicitly consider reasons why it may be more appropriate for a 
foreign state to assert its adjudicative authority.  According to the 
forum non conveniens doctrine, a federal district court may dismiss an 
action in favor of a foreign court “on the ground that a court abroad is 
the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the 
controversy.”34  By denying a motion to dismiss on forum non 
conveniens grounds and keeping the case, the U.S. court asserts 
domestic adjudicative authority over the underlying transnational 
activity; by granting the motion and dismissing the case in favor of a 
Ruritanian court, the U.S. court defers to Ruritanian adjudicative 
authority.  Although a U.S. court cannot force a foreign court to assert 
adjudicative authority over transnational activity,35 these decisions 
                                                                                                             
217 (1962).  The Supreme Court set forth criteria for determining nonjusticiability, including 
whether there is: 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question. 
Id.  See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS:  DOES THE 
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (discussing political question doctrine). 
 33. Additional unilateral doctrines used to dismiss transnational litigation may 
include standing, ripeness, and mootness.  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President 
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:  Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 
1255, 1313-14 (1988) (discussing the use of standing, ripeness, and mootness doctrines to 
dismiss foreign affairs cases); Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 
81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 60–61 (1995) (discussing the use of personal jurisdiction and standing 
as doctrines used to dismiss transnational litigation). 
 34. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 35. Michaels, supra note 28, at 1045.  Indeed, one study suggests that after U.S. 
courts dismiss cases on forum non conveniens grounds, they typically are not refiled in the 
proposed alternative forum.  David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and 
England:  “A Rather Fantastic Fiction,” 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 417-21 (1987).  Although this 
is obviously important from a litigant-oriented perspective, this does not change the fact that 
these decisions involve choices about adjudicative authority.  As Michaels puts it, “the fact 
that courts do not perform their multilateral tasks well has no impact on the fact that this task 
is multilateral.”  Michaels, supra note 28 at 1037 n.151. 
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either implicitly or explicitly involve deference to foreign adjudicative 
authority.36 
 Similarly, judicial enforcement or nonenforcement of choice of 
forum agreements can help determine whether a U.S. or foreign court 
will adjudicate a dispute.37  When a U.S. court enforces an agreement 
to litigate in a foreign court, it defers to foreign adjudicative authority.  
By declining to enforce such an agreement and adjudicating the 
dispute itself, or by enforcing an agreement to litigate in a U.S. court, it 
asserts domestic adjudicative authority.38 
 Other decisions—including decisions to dismiss transnational 
litigation based on international comity39 or the act of state doctrine40 
and decisions to stay litigation on lis alibi pendens grounds when 
                                                 
 36. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (describing forum non 
conveniens as a doctrine for “determining which among various competent courts will decide 
the case”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that “the doctrine 
furnishes criteria for choice between” a domestic forum and a foreign forum); JANIS, supra 
note 5, at 343 (“[C]ourts have fashioned forum non conveniens as a means by which to defer 
to foreign states and foreign courts.”); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the 
Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 786 (1985) (describing forum 
non conveniens “as a means of allocating political authority”).  In fact, U.S. courts often 
make forum non conveniens dismissals subject to the condition that the defendant submit to 
personal jurisdiction in the foreign forum.  See generally John Bies, Comment, Conditioning 
Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489-90 (2000). 
 37. On choice of forum agreements, see BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, ch. 5. 
 38. Alternatively, decisions whether to enforce choice of forum agreements can be 
understood in terms of deference (in the case of enforcement) or lack of deference (in the 
case of nonenforcement) to private authority—namely, the authority of private parties to 
select their forum by contract. 
 39. Comity is “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international 
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under 
the protection of its laws.”  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1895); see, e.g., Ungaro-
Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (dismissing action based on 
international comity doctrine after considering both U.S. and foreign interests, and describing 
comity as an abstention doctrine allowing a federal court that has jurisdiction nevertheless to 
defer to the judgment of a foreign forum). 
 40. According to the act of state doctrine, “[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect 
the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.”  Underhill 
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).  Whether the act of state doctrine is better 
characterized as unilateral or multilateral is unclear.  While the doctrine’s roots are in 
international law and comity, it alternatively has been characterized as a separation of powers 
doctrine and a choice of law doctrine.  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 751-55.  Insofar 
as it is based on comity or choice of law principles, it is multilateral.  As Janis argues, 
“Despite their doctrinal differences, the act of state doctrine and the rules of foreign sovereign 
immunity are functionally similar insofar as both defer to foreign sovereigns . . . .”  JANIS, 
supra note 5, at 365. 
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parallel litigation is pending in a foreign court41—are also multilateral 
in the sense that they are decisions not only to decline assertion of U.S. 
adjudicative authority, but also to defer to foreign adjudicative 
authority.  Decisions to issue antisuit injunctions can also be 
understood as multilateral, although they are assertions of U.S. 
adjudicative authority.42 
b. Prescriptive Authority 
 The U.S. court may also make unilateral or multilateral decisions 
affecting the allocation of prescriptive authority, thus responding to the 
“who prescribes” variant of the fundamental “who governs” question.  
Continuing the example above:  Should U.S. law or Ruritanian law be 
applied to govern the transnational activity giving rise to the dispute 
between AmeriCo and RuriCo?  Unilaterally, the U.S. court might 
simply decide whether the United States has prescriptive authority or 
not.43  The most prominent examples of prescriptive jurisdiction 
decisions in the U.S. federal courts are decisions about whether U.S. 
federal statutes and regulations should be applied extraterritorially.44  
These decisions help allocate prescriptive authority among states 
because they determine whether or not the law of one state—the 
United States—will be applied to transnational activity.  But they leave 
the second half of the “who prescribes” question unanswered:  If not 
the United States, then which state should prescribe the rules to govern 
particular transnational activity?45 
                                                 
 41. Lis alibi pendens is a doctrine that “permits a U.S. court to stay an action before it 
in deference to pending foreign litigation.”  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 522.  The 
extent to which lis pendens decisions are based on multilateral considerations may vary by 
district.  Id. at 524-25. 
 42. Antisuit injunctions are injunctions that “enjoin a litigant from commencing or 
continuing litigation in a foreign forum.”  Id. at 522.  The considerations underlying antisuit 
injunctions are not necessarily multilateral.  Id. at 540-43.  Nevertheless, the occasion to issue 
them only arises when the U.S. court has notice of a pending or threatened parallel suit in a 
foreign court, making antisuit injunction decisions choices between domestic and foreign 
adjudicative authority.  I therefore treat them as multilateral. 
 43. Id. at 613.  For an important empirical analysis of U.S. federal court decisions to 
apply (or not apply) U.S. law extraterritorially, see Putnam, supra note 6. 
 44. See generally Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from 
Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2009). 
 45. In fact, when U.S. courts decide that U.S. federal law does not apply 
extraterritorially, they typically proceed to dismiss the lawsuit because, given the 
inapplicability of the U.S. law, either the plaintiff no longer has a legal basis for its claim or 
the court no longer has the authority to adjudicate.  BORN & RUTLEDGE supra note 20, at 674.  
See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR 
REASONABLENESS 16-17 (1996). 
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 Multilaterally, the U.S. court can allocate prescriptive authority by 
making international choice of law decisions—that is, by deciding 
whether U.S. law or Ruritanian law should apply to activity that has 
connections to both states.46  International choice of law analysis is 
closely related to prescriptive jurisdiction analysis:  unless a state has 
prescriptive jurisdiction, its law is not eligible for selection as 
applicable law.47  But whereas prescriptive jurisdiction analysis is 
unilateral in the sense that it determines whether or not a given state 
has authority, international choice of law analysis is multilateral in the 
sense that it determines which state’s law should apply.  By deciding 
that U.S. law should apply, the U.S. court asserts U.S. prescriptive 
authority, and by deciding that Ruritanian law should apply, the court 
defers to foreign prescriptive authority.48 
c. Enforcement Authority 
 Domestic courts also make decisions that affect the allocation of 
enforcement authority among states, thus helping to answer the “who 
enforces” variant of the “who governs” question.  For example, U.S. 
courts have determined whether extraterritorial seizures of vessels by 
the United States,49 extraterritorial service of subpoenas by U.S. 
regulatory agencies,50 and injunctions issued by U.S. courts with 
                                                 
 46. See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 6, at 14, 154.  Although international 
choice of law is a multilateral decision, insofar as it involves a choice between one state’s law 
and another’s rather than simply a decision about whether one state’s law applies, not all 
choice of law methods are multilateral.  For example, the lex fori method is based on a 
general presumption that domestic law applies.  SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, at 737-41. 
 47. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 561. 
 48. As Joel Trachtman argues, “The durable technical legal questions of choice of law 
and prescriptive jurisdiction resolve into [the same] core normative public policy issue:  how 
should authority be allocated within an interstate or international system?”  Joel P. Trachtman, 
Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2001). 
 49. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362 (1824).  In that case, a French ship allegedly 
entered the United States, failing to pay tonnage duties required by U.S. law.  Id. at 363-65.  
U.S. authorities later arrested the ship in Spanish territorial waters.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
held that the arrest was unjustified, considering Spain’s exclusive jurisdiction and noting that 
“[i]t would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authorized to enter into 
foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against 
our laws.”  Id. at 371-72. 
 50. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 
636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  In that case, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission served a 
subpoena on a French company by registered mail at its headquarters in Paris.  Id. at 1305.  
The French government filed a protest with the U.S. Department of State, arguing that this 
method of service violated French national sovereignty.  Id. at 1306.  The U.S. court held that 
service of the subpoena exceeded U.S. enforcement authority, in violation of international 
law.  Id. at 1318.  In reaching its conclusion, the court explained: 
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purported extraterritorial effects51 exceed U.S. enforcement authority, 
taking into account multilateral considerations. 
 Related to but distinct from enforcement authority decisions are 
U.S. court decisions regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments.  
These decisions also affect the allocation of governance authority 
among states, but not always by allocating enforcement authority.  
Modifying the example above, imagine that RuriCo initiates litigation 
by suing AmeriCo in a Ruritanian court.  The Ruritanian court enters a 
judgment against AmeriCo, but because AmeriCo refuses to pay and 
has no assets within Ruritanian territory, RuriCo cannot enforce the 
judgment there.  RuriCo then asks a U.S. court to order enforcement of 
the Ruritanian court’s judgment against AmeriCo’s assets in the United 
States.  Should the U.S. court do so? 
 Superficially, the U.S. court’s decision whether to order 
enforcement of the Ruritanian judgment is unilateral:  it is a decision 
whether to assert U.S. enforcement authority, not a choice between 
U.S. and Ruritanian enforcement authority.  More fundamentally, it is 
multilateral:  the decision presupposes a foreign state’s prior assertion 
of governance authority, and determines whether that assertion of 
authority will be given domestic effect, an effect it would not 
otherwise have.52  Thus, a U.S. court decision to enforce the Ruritanian 
                                                                                                             
When an American regulatory agency directly serves its compulsory process upon 
a citizen of a foreign country, the act of service itself constitutes an exercise of 
American sovereign power within the area of the foreign country’s territorial 
sovereignty.  Though some techniques of service may prove less obnoxious than 
others to foreign sensibilities, our recognition of those sensibilities must affect our 
willingness to infer congressional authorization for a particular mode of service 
from an otherwise silent statute.  In the face of the foreign country's direct protest 
to the mode of service employed here, and in the absence of clear congressional 
intent at the time this subpoena was served to authorize that manner of exercise of 
American sovereign power, we decline to infer the necessary statutory authority for 
the FTC's chosen mode of subpoena service. 
Id. at 1304. 
 51. See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 78 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (vacating district court injunction on international comity grounds because it 
“purport[ed] to place the court in the position of supervising the law enforcement activities of 
a foreign sovereign nation against its own citizens on its own soil”); see also Younis Bros. & 
Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that 
pursuant to U.S. enforcement authority, “numerous courts have recognized a district court’s 
power to issue an anti-suit injunction that enjoins litigants over which it has in personam 
jurisdiction from pursuing duplicative litigation in a foreign forum”). 
 52. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 1009-10 (“[M]ost courts will enforce 
their own money judgments only against assets within their territorial jurisdiction . . . .  As a 
general rule, therefore, a judgment will operate in foreign states only if the courts of those 
states are willing to provide assistance by recognizing or enforcing the judgment . . . .”).  
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judgment implies an affirmation by the U.S. court that it was 
appropriate under the circumstances for Ruritania to assert its authority 
to adjudicate the dispute.53  In this sense, a domestic court’s decision to 
enforce a foreign judgment can be understood as a form of deference 
to foreign authority even though it involves a subsidiary assertion of 
domestic enforcement authority. 
 Conversely, a refusal to enforce a foreign judgment typically is 
based on a determination by the U.S. court that the foreign state’s court 
did not have proper jurisdiction over the dispute, that the defendant did 
not enjoy certain minimum standards of fairness in the foreign court, 
that enforcement of the foreign judgment would violate U.S. public 
policy, or that the foreign court’s judgment is in some other way 
defective.54  In other words, by refusing to enforce, the U.S. court 
substitutes its own judgment regarding the proper dispute resolution 
process or outcome for that of the Ruritanian court.  In this sense, a 
decision not to enforce a foreign judgment can be understood as an 
assertion of domestic governance authority.55 
2. Allocation of Governance Authority Between Domestic and 
International Institutions 
 Domestic courts also contribute to the allocation of governance 
authority between domestic and international institutions.  For 
example, domestic courts must sometimes respond to the domestic-
international dimension of the “who adjudicates” variant of the “who 
governs” question:  When both a national court and an international 
court appear to have jurisdiction over a particular dispute, how should 
                                                                                                             
Enforcement decisions are sometimes explicitly multilateral when they are based on 
considerations of reciprocity.  Id. at 1014. 
 53. This affirmation may be explicit when a judgment debtor argues against 
enforcement of a foreign judgment by raising the issue of whether the foreign state 
appropriately exercised its adjudicative authority, and the domestic court rejects the argument 
and proceeds to enforce the judgment. 
 54. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 1013-15. 
 55. Born and Rutledge explain: 
“Recognition” and “enforcement” of foreign judgments are related but distinct 
concepts.  The recognition of a foreign judgment occurs when a U.S. court relies 
upon a judicial ruling to preclude litigation of a claim, or issue, on the ground that 
it has been previously litigated abroad . . . .  In contrast, the enforcement of a 
foreign judgment occurs when a court uses its coercive powers to compel a 
defendant . . . to satisfy a judgment rendered abroad. 
Id. at 1010.  Thus, both decisions to recognize and decisions to enforce foreign judgments can 
be understood as forms of deference to foreign authority. 
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adjudicative authority be allocated between them?56  U.S. courts have, 
for example, applied the forum non conveniens doctrine to choose 
between assertion of domestic adjudicative authority and deference to 
the adjudicative authority of an international tribunal.57 
 Moreover, although often overlooked in conflict-of-laws 
scholarship,58 international choice of law problems may involve not 
only domestic-foreign law conflicts but also domestic-international 
law conflicts.59  Such conflicts raise the domestic-international 
dimension of the “who prescribes” variant of the fundamental “who 
governs” question, and domestic courts help answer it in a variety of 
circumstances. 
 In the United States, two types of decisions are particularly 
relevant.  First, according to the self-executing treaty doctrine, self-
executing treaties are treaties that automatically have effect as domestic 
law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,60 
whereas non-self-executing treaties are not enforceable in domestic 
courts absent domestic implementing legislation.61  In litigation 
challenging domestic legal rules or governmental action on the ground 
that they violate a treaty that has not been implemented through 
legislation, the practical implication is that deference to international 
                                                 
 56. See generally YUVAL SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 1-2 (2007) (noting instances of overlapping 
jurisdiction of domestic and international courts); Martinez, supra note 6, at 492, 496-98 
(same). 
 57. See, e.g., Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 315 F.3d 390, 
395 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reversing trial court’s forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of 
Ethiopia/Eritrea Claims Commission); In re:  Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. Holocaust Ins. 
Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying forum non conveniens motion, which 
sought to dismiss in favor of proceedings before the International Commission on Holocaust 
Era Insurance Claims).  See generally Ryan T. Bergsieker, Comment, International Tribunals 
and Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 114 YALE L.J. 443 (2004). 
 58. For example, neither of the two current leading commentaries on conflict of laws 
have a section discussing conflicts between domestic law and international law.  See SCOLES 
ET AL., supra note 5; WEINTRAUB, supra note 25.  However, three leading legal scholars have 
recently spearheaded an effort to develop a conflict-of-laws approach to conflicts between 
domestic and international law.  See Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, 
International Law in Domestic Courts:  A Conflict of Laws Approach, 103 AM. SOC’Y OF 
INT’L L. PROC. (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413189. 
 59. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2006) (“National 
courts may be authorized by their states to use international law as a source of law in their 
decision-making. . . . [I]nternational law serves as one source of law among many competing 
sources, with hierarchies that differ depending on the peculiarities of each nation’s 
constitutional structure.”). 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 61. See generally JANIS, supra note 5, at 87-89 (discussing self-executing treaty 
doctrine). 
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prescriptive authority depends on judicial characterization of the treaty 
as self-executing.62  Otherwise, the challenged domestic act will prevail 
over the treaty.63  Functionally, then, judicial characterization of a treaty 
as self-executing or not can help allocate prescriptive authority along 
the domestic-international dimension.64 
 Second, domestic courts use various interpretive devices to avoid 
conflicts between domestic and international law in ways that can 
affect the domestic-international allocation of authority.  According to 
the Charming Betsy canon, “[A]n act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”65  U.S. courts can use this canon of 
construction to construe a national legal rule to conform to an 
international legal rule.66  As Curtis Bradley argues, “This indirect, 
                                                 
 62. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (holding city ordinance 
to be in violation of self-executing treaty).  In states where the domestic status of treaties is 
more clearly delineated by the constitution, or where determinations of that status are vested 
solely in the legislature, the role of domestic courts in allocating between domestic and 
international authority may be less important than in the United States.  The broader point is 
that the exact role of domestic courts in allocating governance authority varies cross-
nationally along with cross-national differences in legal and political systems. 
 63. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (upholding Texas’ limitations 
on habeas applications notwithstanding contrary ruling of International Court of Justice [ICJ] 
on grounds that the provision of the United Nations Charter obligating members to comply 
with ICJ judgments is non-self-executing). 
 64. This function, however, does not affect the status of a treaty as an international 
obligation of the United States; it only determines whether it “automatically constitute[s] 
binding federal law enforceable in United States courts.”  Id. at 1356. 
 65. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).  If the conflict involves 
U.S. federal legislation and cannot be avoided through statutory construction, a U.S. court 
will ordinarily apply the later-in-time rule to allocate prescriptive authority—a rule that would 
seem to allow far less discretion than the self-executing treaty doctrine or the Charming Betsy 
canon.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 
(1987).  On the Charming Betsy canon, see generally Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a 
Matter of Interpretation:  The Use and Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339 
(2006). 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988).  In that case, the Department of Justice sought an injunction closing the Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s (PLO) observer mission to the United Nations, pursuant to the U.S. 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA).  The ATA provides: 
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization . . . notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, 
to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or 
establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction 
of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . . 
22 U.S.C.A. § 5202(3) (West 2004).  But the presence of the PLO’s observer mission in the 
United States was authorized by the Agreement Between the United States and the United 
Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (Headquarters Agreement).  
Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1458-59.  Applying the Charming Betsy doctrine, 
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‘phantom’ use of international law can, in some cases, have the same 
effect as direct incorporation of international law.”67  Such conflicts can 
also be avoided by construing an international legal rule to be 
consistent with domestic law.68  In both cases, a court uses construction 
to avoid a conflict between domestic and international authority.  But 
in the former, the court effectively defers to international prescriptive 
authority, while in the latter, the court prioritizes domestic prescriptive 
authority.  Even in the absence of explicit conflict, domestic courts 
sometimes use international treaties—including non-self-executing 
treaties—in interpreting domestic law, in a process of “interpretive 
incorporation” of international law.69  Insofar as it increases the extent 
to which domestic courts interpret domestic legal rules to conform to 
international legal rules, the use (or nonuse) of this method influences 
the allocation of prescriptive authority along the domestic-international 
dimension. 
 Beyond the self-executing treaty doctrine and canons of 
construction, U.S. courts make explicit choices between domestic and 
international law in litigation under the Alien Tort Statute.70  
Jurisdictionally, the Alien Tort Statute requires a tort “committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”71  As 
the rule of decision, however, U.S. courts sometimes apply domestic 
law (thus asserting domestic prescriptive authority) and sometimes 
apply international law (thus deferring to international prescriptive 
authority).72  Within the European legal system, national courts 
frequently defer to the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) 
interpretations of EU law through the preliminary reference 
procedure.73  And even outside Europe, some domestic courts treat ECJ 
                                                                                                             
the court interpreted the ATA so as not to require closure of the PLO’s mission, thus resolving 
the conflict with the Headquarters Agreement.  Id. at 1465. 
 67. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:  
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 483 (1997). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666 (1992) (construing 
the 1978 U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty broadly so as not to bar extraterritorial forcible 
abduction operation by United States Drug Enforcement Administration). 
 69. See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism:  The Judicial Trend Toward 
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007). 
 70. See generally Philip A. Scarborough, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under 
the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 485-500 (2007) (discussing choice between 
state law and international law in ATS litigation). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 72. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 73. SHANY, supra note 56, at 33-34.  This procedure is authorized by article 234 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, which provides that the ECJ has 
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and European Court of Human Rights decisions as persuasive legal 
authority, a milder but nevertheless significant form of deference to 
international prescriptive authority.74 
 In addition, U.S. court decisions regarding the domestic 
enforceability of international court judgments are relevant to the 
domestic-international dimension of the “who governs” question.  
When a domestic court and an international court adjudicate the same 
issue but with different outcomes, which decision should prevail?  By 
answering this question, domestic courts make not only unilateral 
decisions about whether to assert domestic enforcement authority to 
give an international court judgment domestic effect, but also 
multilateral decisions about whether to give priority to the domestic or 
international court’s adjudication of the issue. 
 The Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in Medellin v. Texas is a 
prominent example of such a decision.75  The state of Texas convicted 
Medellin, a Mexican national, of murder and sentenced him to death.76  
During his initial detention, law enforcement officers failed to notify 
him of his right under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to 
request the assistance of the Mexican consul.77  Medellin raised this 
point only after his conviction, and the state trial court held that the 
claim was barred by Texas procedural rules requiring him to have 
raised it at trial or on direct review.78  The International Court of Justice 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:  (a) the interpretation of this 
Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the 
Community and of the [European Central Bank]; (c) the interpretation of the 
statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so 
provide.  Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member 
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling 
thereon.  Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or 
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice. 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 127. 
 74. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 79-82; see also Karen Knop, Here and There:  
International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 INT’L L. & POL. 501 (2000) (criticizing the 
emphasis on domestic courts as “enforcers” of international law and focusing instead on the 
use of international law as persuasive authority in domestic courts). 
 75. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).  But see Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 
3711623, at *3 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (Chapel, J., concurring) (granting postconviction 
relief based on the ICJ’s resolution of the dispute under the Vienna Convention). 
 76. 128 S. Ct. at 1354. 
 77. Id.; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 78. 128 S. Ct. at 1353. 
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(ICJ) held that the United States thus violated the Vienna Convention 
and determined that the United States was obligated “to provide . . . 
review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences” of 
Medellin and fifty other Mexican nationals similarly convicted by U.S. 
states without notification of their Vienna Convention rights.79  The 
state of Texas refused to comply with the ICJ’s ruling, notwithstanding 
a memorandum by the U.S. president stating that the United States 
would “discharge its international obligations” under the ICJ’s decision 
“by having State courts give effect to the decision.”80  The Supreme 
Court held that the ICJ’s judgment was not directly enforceable as 
domestic law.81  The Supreme Court’s decision turned on a variety of 
legal considerations,82 but a practical effect of the decision not to 
enforce was to prioritize the domestic authority of Texas over the 
international authority of the ICJ. 
 If, as some scholars suggest, private litigants are increasingly 
requesting domestic judicial enforcement of the judgments of 
international courts,83 this domestic-international dimension of judicial 
allocation of governance authority is likely to be of growing 
importance.84  As one observer remarks: 
[W]ith the advent of supranational institutions that legislate, prosecute, 
and adjudicate, and the concomitant need to manage the relationship 
between those institutions and parallel institutions at the national level, 
International Law seems likely to become increasingly preoccupied 
with managing jurisdictional conflicts and developing rules for 
remedies and choice of law . . . .85 
Until such a body of international law develops, however, domestic 
courts will have an especially important role to play in addressing 
these issues.  Even if such a body of international law does eventually 
develop, domestic courts will likely play an important role in 
interpreting and applying it. 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id. at 1355-56 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. Id. at 1357. 
 82. The court held that the relevant treaties were non-self-executing and that the 
President could not unilaterally render them domestically enforceable against the state of 
Texas.  Id. at 1357, 1368. 
 83. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Toward a Framework Statute for Supranational 
Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. 93, 93 (2007). 
 84. See, e.g., SHANY, supra note 56, at 2 (noting that the increase in the number and 
activity of international courts is increasing the opportunities for jurisdictional conflict 
between national and international courts, giving rise to a “need to regulate jurisdictional 
overlaps between national and international courts”). 
 85. Young, supra note 83, at 93-94. 
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3. Allocation of Governance Authority Between Private and Public 
Institutions 
 In addition to the allocation of governance authority among states 
and between domestic and international institutions, domestic courts 
help allocate governance authority between state and nonstate actors.  
Returning to the example above, suppose that prior to their dispute, 
AmeriCo and RuriCo agreed to submit any transnational disputes 
between them to binding arbitration by a private arbitral institution 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce.  A dispute arises and, 
notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, AmeriCo sues RuriCo in a 
U.S. court based on an ex post assessment that it is likely to fare better 
in litigation than arbitration.  RuriCo then asks the U.S. court to 
enforce the arbitration agreement against AmeriCo.  Although there is 
a presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration agreements under 
U.S. and international law, U.S. courts may decline enforcement on a 
variety of grounds.86  By enforcing the agreement, the U.S. court can 
allocate adjudicative authority to the arbitral institution, thus deferring 
to private authority.87  By refusing to enforce the agreement and 
allowing litigation to proceed, the U.S. court can instead assert public 
adjudicative authority. 
 Domestic courts may also influence the allocation of prescriptive 
authority between public and private actors.  As Symeon Symeonides 
explains: 
[P]arties may—through an express choice-of-law clause or through 
“incorporation”—subject their contract to non-state norms, such as 
commercial usages, the lex mercatoria, the UNIDROIT Principles, the 
general principles of law, or, in Europe, the Principles of European 
[Contract] Law (PECL) . . . [provided that] the choice of non-state 
                                                 
 86. Under article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, domestic courts may decline to enforce arbitration 
agreements if they find them “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”  
U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. II, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force on Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter 
New York Convention].  Under article V, they may decline to enforce arbitral awards on 
various grounds, including domestic public policy.  Id. art. V.  Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, “[a] court shall confirm [an arbitral award covered by the New York Convention] unless 
it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award 
specified in the said Convention.”  9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). 
 87. This is deference to private authority, both because the arbitrator is a nonstate 
actor, and because the decision gives effect to a private agreement (the agreement to 
arbitrate). 
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norms may not exceed the limits of party autonomy as defined by the 
state whose law would otherwise govern the contract.88 
Thus, if AmeriCo and RuriCo agree that their transnational activity 
shall be governed by, for example, the PECL rather than the law of a 
particular state, and AmeriCo sues RuriCo in a U.S. court, then the 
U.S. court can decide whether to apply the PECL on the one hand or, 
depending on a traditional choice of law analysis, domestic or foreign 
law on the other hand.  By applying the PECL, the U.S. court would 
defer to the private authority of AmeriCo and RuriCo to select the 
rules to govern their transnational activity.89  By declining to do so and 
instead applying state law, the U.S. court would assert public 
prescriptive authority. 
 In summary, domestic courts perform a jurisdictional global 
governance function by helping to allocate three types of governance 
authority over transnational activity:  adjudicative authority, 
prescriptive authority, and enforcement authority.  They do so along 
three dimensions:  among states, between domestic and international 
institutions, and between public and private institutions.  The answers 
to these variants of the fundamental “who governs” question are rarely 
obvious.  Because transnational activity by definition has connections 
to more than one state, more than one state may have a basis for 
legitimately exercising the authority to govern it.  With private actors 
increasingly claiming authority to govern transnational activity 
traditionally governed by the state, the allocation of governance 
authority between public and private institutions also poses serious 
challenges.90  And with the spread of international law and inter-
national courts, there are equally difficult choices to make about 
whether they or domestic institutions should govern particular 
transnational activity.91  As a result, the jurisdictional function of 
domestic courts in global governance is likely to be of growing 
importance. 
                                                 
 88. Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, 54 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 209, 211 (Supp. 2006). 
 89. One might also characterize such a decision as deference to the Commission on 
European Contract Law, the private group of independent experts that drafted these 
principles.  See Symeon C. Symeonides, Party Autonomy and Private-Law Making in Private 
International Law:  The Lex Mercatoria That Isn’t 1-2 (Nov. 19, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946007. 
 90. See THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Rodney 
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (describing the growing role of private actors 
in global governance). 
 91. See SHANY, supra note 56 (describing the jurisdictional challenges posed by the 
spread of international courts). 
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B. Who Gets What?  Judicial Determination of Rights and 
Obligations of Transnational Actors 
 The second fundamental question of global governance is:  Who 
gets what?92  In other words:  Who enjoys which rights and who bears 
which obligations in transnational activity?  Domestic courts help 
answer this question by determining rights and obligations of 
transnational actors with respect to each other and with respect to 
economic and political resources.93  This is the substantive global 
governance function of domestic courts. 
 It is well understood that the determination of rights and 
obligations is a basic function of courts.94  Courts are, after all, dispute 
resolvers, and litigation paradigmatically arises out of disputes over 
parties’ respective rights and obligations.  But the determination of 
rights and obligations is more than a dispute resolution function.  
When dispute resolution is based on rules, it becomes a form of 
regulation.95  From the perspective of political science, then, courts are 
important not only because they resolve discrete disputes, but also 
because they contribute to the authoritative allocation of resources 
within a society.96 
 Neither legal scholars nor political scientists have systematically 
explored the implications of this judicial function for global 
governance.  However, existing research on three types of transnational 
litigation provides a point of departure for doing so:  transnational 
regulatory litigation, transnational public law litigation, and 
                                                 
 92. The “who gets what” question has long preoccupied scholars of domestic systems 
of governance.  See, e.g., HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS:  WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW 
(1936); James A. Caporaso, Herbert P. Kitschelt, Erik M. Wibbels & Steven I. Wilkinson, 
Introduction:  Fortieth Anniversary Issue, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 405, 406 (2008) (focusing on 
“who gets what” as one of the fundamental questions of comparative politics).  Here, I ask 
the question with respect to global governance. 
 93. Of course, constitutions and domestic legislation, as well as treaties and 
international custom, also play a critical role in the determination of rights and obligations—
they are the sources of many of the legal rules that courts interpret and apply in transnational 
litigation.  By focusing on the role of domestic courts, I seek to highlight how domestic court 
decision making helps determine rights and obligations of transnational actors, not to 
downplay the importance of these legal sources. 
 94. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 7, at 281 (“What groups are benefited or handicapped 
by the [United States Supreme] Court and how does the allocation by the Court of these 
rewards and penalties fit into our presumably democratic political system?”); Martin Shapiro, 
From Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public Law,” 5 POL. SCI. & POL. 410, 
413 (1972) (discussing “judicial allocation of values”). 
 95. Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 25 (arguing that as long as a judge acts to impose 
preexisting rules on the disputants, the judge is importing an element of social control). 
 96. Shapiro, supra note 94, at 412-13. 
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transnational private litigation.  This Part brings together these separate 
bodies of scholarship, making explicit a theme that is implicit in each 
of them:  that domestic courts help determine rights and obligations of 
transnational actors, thus participating in the substantive regulation of 
transnational activity and influencing the allocation of economic and 
political resources. 
1. Transnational Regulatory Litigation 
 “Transnational regulatory litigation” is litigation in which 
domestic courts apply domestic regulatory norms to determine the 
rights and obligations of transnational actors.97  As Hannah Buxbaum 
argues in her seminal article on the subject, this type of litigation 
enables domestic courts to “serve as an instrument of global economic 
regulation.”98  For example, U.S. courts apply U.S. antitrust law to 
regulate global cartels and other anticompetitive transnational 
activity,99 U.S. securities laws to regulate cross-border securities 
fraud,100 and U.S. environmental law to address transnational 
environmental disputes.101  Insofar as these legal issues involve 
economic misconduct and harms to economic welfare, their judicial 
resolution affects how economic resources are allocated among 
transnational actors such as consumers, investors, and producers.102 
2. Transnational Public Law Litigation 
 “Transnational public law litigation” is litigation in which 
“[p]rivate individuals, government officials, and nations sue one 
another directly, and are sued directly, in a variety of judicial fora, most 
                                                 
 97. See Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 268 (defining transnational regulatory litigation as 
litigation in domestic courts involving the application of domestic regulatory norms that are 
shared by the international regulatory community to transnational activity, in a manner that 
provides global regulatory benefits).  For my descriptive purposes, I adopt a broader 
definition of transnational regulatory jurisdiction, dropping the requirement that the domestic 
regulatory rules that are applied necessarily are shared by the regulatory community or have a 
beneficial effect on transnational activity. 
 98. Id. at 255. 
 99. Id. at 257-61. 
 100. Id. at 271-78. 
 101. See generally Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu:  Extraterritoriality, 
International Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. 
Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363 (2005) (describing application 
of domestic environmental regulations by U.S. courts to cross-border environmental 
disputes). 
 102. Cf. Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 252-53 (referring to “application of regulatory law 
by domestic courts in situations involving global economic misconduct” in ways that can 
“marshal[] the resources of national courts in order to improve the global welfare”). 





2009] DOMESTIC COURTS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 93 
 
prominently, domestic courts,” based on rights derived from both 
domestic and international law.103  In the United States, the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), which gives federal district courts jurisdiction over any 
civil action brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of 
international law,104 is the foundation for most transnational public law 
litigation.105  As the leading scholar of transnational public law 
litigation, Harold Koh, points out, plaintiffs in this type of litigation are 
frequently private individuals alleging human rights violations by 
government officials.106  However, private actors may also be subject to 
liability under the ATS for sufficiently “state-like or state-related 
activities.”107  Because transnational public law litigation rarely results 
in enforceable awards of monetary damages, domestic court decisions 
in these cases generally do not involve distribution of economic 
resources.108  They do, however, declare the respective rights and 
obligations of transnational actors under human rights law.  Moreover, 
when these declarations favor the plaintiff, the effect is to distribute a 
significant political resource:  such declarations can be used as “a 
bargaining chip for use in other political fora” to influence 
governmental behavior.109 
                                                 
 103. Koh, supra note 6, at 2348-49.  As Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco note, 
“Increasing numbers of individuals, including torture and terrorism victims, Holocaust 
survivors, and denizens of the dwindling Amazon rain forest, are now using lawsuits to 
defend their rights under international law [in U.S. courts].  The defendants in these cases 
include multinational corporations, foreign government officials, and even foreign states 
themselves.”  Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, 102. 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (providing that federal district courts have jurisdiction 
over any civil action brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of international 
law). 
 105. See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalization of Domestic Law, in 
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT:  AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 3, 9 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & 
Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999) (discussing litigation under the ATS).  The seminal human 
rights case under the ATS is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 106. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Haitian Refugee Litigation:  A Case Study in 
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 18 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 3 (1994). 
 107. Steinhardt, supra note 105, at 9. 
 108. See Koh, supra note 6, at 2368 (“[N]o Filartiga-type plaintiff has apparently 
collected full compensation for his injuries . . . .”).  However, insofar as the threat of ATS 
litigation induces monetary settlements, they may indirectly allocate economic resources 
among transnational actors.  I thank Samuel Baumgartner for pointing this out.  In fact, in 
June 2009, the Royal Dutch Shell company agreed to pay $15.5 million to settle a 
transnational public law claim based on allegations that the company was complicit in the 
1995 executions of environmental and human rights advocates in Nigeria.  Robyn Dixon, 
Niger Delta Inhabitants See Compensation for Executions as a New Beginning, L.A. TIMES, 
June 10, 2009, http://www.articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/10/world/fg-nigeria-shell10. 
 109. Koh, supra note 6, at 2349. 
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3. Transnational Private Litigation 
 An emphasis on public law, including domestic regulatory law 
and human rights law, runs the risk of obscuring the role of domestic 
private law in global governance.  Private law—which includes the law 
of torts, contracts, and property—is just as much an instrument of 
regulation as public law.110  Indeed, “[t]he ‘private’ law of property and 
contract authoritatively allocates most of the values in a capitalist 
society.”111  Thus, Robert Wai makes a critical contribution by drawing 
attention to “transnational private litigation,” which he defines as 
litigation of private law claims by transnational actors in domestic 
courts.112 
 The policies underlying private law include compensation for 
harm, correction of market failures, and deterrence of undesirable 
activity.113  Thus, transnational private litigation can serve both 
distributive and regulatory functions.114  Disputes over property 
rights—including intellectual property rights—explicitly involve 
conflicting claims over economic resources.  In such disputes, 
domestic courts distribute those resources by assigning property rights 
to one party or another.115  Transnational actors enter contracts to 
reduce their uncertainty about how they will share the costs and 
benefits of their economic transactions.  In contract disputes, domestic 
                                                 
 110. See Shapiro, supra note 94, at 413 (noting, for example, the law of torts, as well 
as “credit-debtor, landlord-tenant, seller-purchaser and a host of other areas of [private] law 
that set the balance of economic power between competing segments of a society”); see also 
Ronald A. Brand, Private Law and Public Regulation in U.S. Courts, in 2 PRIVATE LAW, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE EU-US RELATIONSHIP 115 
(Ronald A. Brand ed., 2005) (explaining the public role of private litigation in the United 
States); Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown:  The Regulatory 
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 209, 232-38 (2002) (discussing the transnational regulatory function of domestic private 
laws). 
 111. Martin Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial Politics, in POLITICAL SCIENCE:  THE 
STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE II 365, 366 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993). 
 112. Wai, supra note 6, at 244 (defining transnational private litigation as “trans-
national litigation of private law claims in national courts”). 
 113. Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested 
Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471, 474 (2005). 
 114. Wai, supra note 6, at 245. 
 115. On the economics of property law, see generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS chs. 4-5 (3d ed. 2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Economic Analysis of Law 14-29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6960, 
1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6960. 
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courts distribute these costs and benefits by determining how the 
contract is interpreted and whether it is enforced.116 
 In addition, transnational economic activity may generate 
externalities.  That is, it may have effects on actors who do not have a 
contractual relationship with the person engaged in that activity.117  In 
tort disputes, domestic courts distribute the costs of negative 
externalities among transnational actors by determining the extent to 
which the party generating the externalities is obligated to compensate 
the party that bears the associated costs.118  At the intersection of 
transnational public law litigation and transnational private litigation 
are disputes involving the economic activity of sovereign states, 
including disputes over sovereign debt,119 disputes between states and 
foreign private investors,120 and, more generally, transnational litigation 
arising out of the commercial activity of foreign sovereigns.121  Thus, 
the contributions of domestic courts to global governance in 
transnational private litigation seem to be at least as important as in 
transnational regulatory litigation and transnational public law 
litigation. 
 In transnational regulatory litigation, domestic courts apply 
domestic regulations to transnational activity; in transnational public 
law litigation, they apply human rights law; and in transnational private 
litigation, they apply tort, property, and contract law.  Notwithstanding 
these differences, in all three contexts, one sees the substantive global 
governance function of domestic courts:  domestic court decisions 
determine rights and obligations of transnational actors and frequently 
influence the distribution of economic and political resources among 
those actors.  This substantive function responds to the fundamental 
“who gets what” question in global governance.  The jurisdictional 
                                                 
 116. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 149, 153 (1988) (“The [legal] realists showed that the rules of classical contract law 
represent the exercise of public power as much as the rules of antitrust law.”). 
 117. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 115, at 290 (defining negative externalities as 
harms that occur outside a contractual relationship). 
 118. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 94, at 413-14 (noting that tort law “is anxious to 
define justice between man and man almost exclusively in terms of what treatment of 
individual litigants will best achieve preferred public goals”). 
 119. See generally Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The 
Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007). 
 120. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-
Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138 (2007) (analyzing the 
use of courts and alternative dispute resolution methods for resolving disputes between states 
and foreign private investors). 
 121. The U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction over some such suits under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). 
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function discussed above responds to the “who governs” question—
that is:  Who decides who gets what?  These functions are summarized 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. 







Who governs? Allocation among states, 
between domestic and 
international institutions, 












Who gets what? Transnational regulatory 
litigation 
 





III. THE TRANSNATIONAL SHADOW OF THE LAW 
 The global governance functions of domestic courts discussed in 
Part II clearly matter for litigants.  It goes without saying that the 
litigants care how domestic courts perform the substantive global 
governance function.  After all, the judicial answer to the “who gets 
what” question determines the litigants’ respective rights and 
obligations.  The jurisdictional function of domestic courts—for 
example, judicial allocation of adjudicative authority—also matters for 
litigants.  Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg find a strong 
“forum effect” in domestic litigation in U.S. federal courts:  when the 
plaintiff’s initial choice of forum is defeated, the chance of winning 
decreases substantially.122  Choice of forum is even more important in 
                                                 
 122. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 124 (2002).  They find that plaintiffs’ win rate in federal civil cases drops from 





2009] DOMESTIC COURTS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 97 
 
transnational litigation, due to the “[s]hifting inconveniences and 
changing biases” associated with a move from a domestic court to a 
foreign court (or vice versa).123  Finally, transnational litigants care 
about the answer to the “who prescribes” question.  Because legal rules 
vary substantially across states, which state’s law applies can determine 
which side wins.124 
 This Part argues that the global governance functions of domestic 
courts are important not only because of their impact on litigants, but 
also—and perhaps even more importantly—because of their influence 
beyond borders and beyond the parties to particular lawsuits.  
Domestic court decisions affect the behavior of transnational actors, 
including strategic behavior such as transnational bargaining and 
transnational forum shopping; they can either increase or reduce global 
economic welfare; and they can either hinder or provide support for 
other global governance institutions, including international 
institutions like international law and international courts, and private 
institutions like transnational contracting and transnational arbitration.  
These broader effects suggest that domestic courts play an important 
role in global governance.  At the very least, the effectiveness of 
international and private forms of global governance depends 
significantly on the support of domestic courts. 
 To help highlight these broader implications of domestic court 
decision making, this Part takes Robert Mnookin and Lewis 
Kornhauser’s well-known “shadow of the law” metaphor—used by 
them to elucidate the influence of divorce courts on the behavior of 
divorcing couples “outside the courtroom”125—and extends it to 
transnational activity.  Thus, the “transnational shadow of the law” 
refers to the effects of domestic courts that radiate beyond borders and 
beyond the parties to particular lawsuits.126 
                                                                                                             
58% in cases in which there is no transfer to 29% in transferred cases and, after controlling 
for all available variables, “[a] plaintiff’s 50% odds would drop after transfer of venue to 
approximately 40%.”  Id. 
 123. Kevin M. Clermon, The Role of Private International Law in the United States:  
Beating the Not-Quite-Dead Horse of Jurisdiction 8 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 04-012, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=588321. 
 124. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 562. 
 125. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 951, 968, 972-73; see also Shapiro, 
supra note 14, at 329 (“[L]egalized bargaining under the shadow supervision of an available 
court . . . is not purely mediatory, because the bargain struck will depend in part on the ‘legal’ 
strength of the parties, that is, predictions of how each would fare in court.”). 
 126. Cf. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
ABOUT COURTS 117, 121 (Keith O. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983) (referring to “[t]he 
[r]adiating [e]ffects of [c]ourts” in the domestic context); Wai, supra note 110, at 267 
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A. Domestic Courts and the Strategic Behavior of Transnational 
Actors 
 Domestic court decisions can affect the strategic behavior of 
transnational actors.  Strategic behavior is behavior by one actor based 
on the anticipated behavior of other actors.127  Strategic behavior occurs 
when one actor’s ability to further its goals depends on “how other 
actors behave.”128  Under those conditions, its decisions must take into 
account the expected actions of those other actors.129  As game theorist 
James Morrow explains, “[a]n actor cannot simply choose a course of 
action that produces its preferred outcome because the choices of 
others also affect the final result.”130  Because actors generally do not 
know with certainty how others will behave, they typically infer future 
behavior from past behavior.131  Thus, strategic behavior is largely a 
function of available information upon which inferences can be made 
about the future behavior of others. 
 Applied to the transnational shadow of the law, the implication of 
this logic is that insofar as the ability of transnational actors to reach 
their goals depends on domestic court decisions, their behavior will be 
partly a function of their expectations about how domestic courts will 
make those decisions.  These expectations in turn depend significantly 
on transnational actors’ knowledge about prior domestic court 
decisions. 
 Having abstractly explained how domestic court decisions can 
affect the behavior of transnational actors, this Part will now illustrate 
this strategic logic in two contexts:  transnational bargaining and 
transnational forum shopping.  The first is an example of the strategic 
                                                                                                             
(referring to the “shadow of the law” to describe the reliance of transnational arbitration on 
national legal systems).  The definition of “transnational law” explicitly recognizes that 
domestic law can have transnational implications.  See Jessup, supra note 15, at 1-2 (defining 
transnational law as law, whether domestic or international, public or private, “which 
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers”).  The concept of the trans-
national shadow of the law complements the concept of transnational law by drawing 
attention to the transnational implications of domestic court decisionmaking and emphasizing 
the distinction between transnational legal doctrine and the domestic courts that interpret and 
apply it. 
 127. See David A. Lake & Robert Powell, International Relations:  A Strategic-Choice 
Approach, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 3 (David A. Lake & 
Robert Powell eds., 1999) (describing the strategic choice approach). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. James D. Morrow, The Strategic Setting of Choices:  Signaling, Commitment, 
and Negotiation in International Politics, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 127, at 77, 77. 
 131. Lake & Powell, supra note 127, at 9. 
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behavioral effects of the substantive global governance function of 
domestic courts (determination of rights and obligations of trans-
national actors), and the second is an example of the jurisdictional 
function (allocation of governance authority).132 
1. Bargaining in the Transnational Shadow of the Law 
 First, domestic court decisions affect bargaining among 
transnational actors.  Scholars have long argued that bargaining is a 
form of strategic behavior that depends on court decisions.133  Martin 
Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet explain the basic logic as follows: 
[B]argaining is facilitated by the knowledge of each party that, if the 
two do not reach a consensual resolution to the conflict, the other may 
go to court and seek an imposed outcome.  Just as important, the 
previously judicially announced rules that will determine what a court 
will impose if litigation does occur fix the parameters within which the 
two parties bargain even if neither ever goes to court.  The relative legal 
strengths of the two parties, as defined by those rules judicially 
announced to resolve previously litigated disputes, are crucial factors in 
determining the bargaining strengths of negotiating parties in other 
disputes that are not litigated but, in form, are resolved by purely 
private, consensual agreements.134 
Similarly, bargaining among transnational actors depends on domestic 
court decisions.  When a domestic court makes a decision that 
determines rights and obligations of transnational actors, the effect is 
not only particular and retrospective in the sense that it binds specific 
transnational actors (the litigants) regarding an existing dispute; it also 
is general and prospective, because the decision sends a signal to 
transnational actors that the court will make a similar decision under 
similar circumstances in the future.135  Thus, the substantive function of 
domestic courts in global governance has not only direct effects on the 
                                                 
 132. Although this Part emphasizes the impact of domestic court decisions on the 
strategic behavior of transnational actors, it is important to note that domestic court decisions 
can also influence the normative, rule-based behavior of transnational actors.  See generally 
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943, 949-51 (1998) (comparing behavioral logic of consequences, 
which characterizes strategic choice, and the logic appropriateness, which characterizes 
norm-based decision making). 
 133. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14 (explaining influence of court 
decisions on bargaining outside the courtroom); Shapiro, supra note 14 (same). 
 134. SHAPIRO & SWEET supra note 7, at 213. 
 135. Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational 
Constitution:  Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 63, 64 (1998). 
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litigants, but also indirect shadow effects on the strategic behavior of 
transnational actors more generally. 
 In fact, sometimes plaintiffs are more interested in the strategic 
than the direct effects of transnational litigation, as in the case of 
transnational public law litigation.136  As Koh explains, judges may 
claim to be resolving only a particular dispute, but they are “actually 
declaring (or not declaring) international norms that litigants transport 
to other fora for use in political bargaining.”137 
2. Transnational Forum Shopping 
 Domestic court decisions allocating governance authority 
influence another form of strategic behavior:  transnational forum 
shopping.138  When deciding where to file a lawsuit, plaintiffs consider, 
among other things, which state’s laws are most favorable to their 
claim.139  For example, if the U.S. company AmeriCo decides to sue the 
Ruritanian company RuriCo, and AmeriCo believes it is more likely to 
win under U.S. law than under Ruritanian law, it may file its lawsuit in 
a U.S. court, even if the transnational activity giving rise to its dispute 
with RuriCo occurred primarily in Ruritanian territory.  If U.S. courts 
tend to decide that U.S. law should apply in such circumstances, they 
would encourage this type of forum shopping.140  In contrast, if they 
instead tend to apply the law of the place of the underlying 
transnational activity (in this case, Ruritanian law), they would 
discourage this form of forum shopping by removing the advantage of 
more favorable U.S. law.141 
                                                 
 136. See Koh, supra note 6, at 2349 (explaining that transnational public law plaintiffs 
pursue prospective aims—obtaining a judicial declaration of a norm that they can then use in 
bargaining—rather than strictly retrospective goals, such a obtaining damages). 
 137. Id. at 2395; see also Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 316 (explaining that transnational 
regulatory litigation “enable[s] national courts to participate in implementing effective 
regulatory strategies for global markets”); Wai, supra note 6, at 250 (noting that transnational 
private litigation can “introduce [new] policy values (sometimes through new policy actors) 
into political negotiations or decision making in other venues, domestic or international”). 
 138. See ROBERT M. COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 59 (Martha Minow, 
Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat eds., 4th prtg. 1995) (describing the “strategic behavior 
entailed in forum shopping”). 
 139. ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 
24 (2003). 
 140. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. 
L. REV. 553, 558-59 (1989) (explaining this relationship between choice of law and forum 
shopping). 
 141. See id. at 559 (“[T]he very purpose of the classical [e.g. lex loci delicti (place of 
the wrong)] conflicts system was the prevention of forum shopping.”). 
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 Similarly, if U.S. courts tend to dismiss cases arising from 
extraterritorial activity, they would discourage this type of forum 
shopping.  For example, in the United States, the forum non 
conveniens doctrine is widely understood as an “anti-forum-shopping 
device” because it allows a U.S. court to dismiss transnational 
litigation in favor of a more appropriate foreign court even if the U.S. 
court has jurisdiction.142 
 Legal doctrine—including choice of law rules and the forum non 
conveniens doctrine—may play an independent role in deterring forum 
shopping.  But the real deterrent effect depends largely on how 
domestic courts actually apply those rules to allocate governance 
authority.143 
B. Domestic Courts and the Global Economy 
 The manner in which domestic courts allocate governance 
authority also has implications for the global economy.  For example, 
Michael Whincop and Mary Keyes suggest that by allocating 
adjudicative authority to those forums which entail the lowest litigation 
costs, domestic courts can enhance global efficiency.144  Alan Sykes 
implies that judicial allocation of adjudicative authority should be 
understood as a trade and investment issue.145  He argues that suits in 
U.S. courts against U.S. firms arising from activity occurring outside 
the United States can lead to discriminatory application of more 
stringent U.S. liability standards to the behavior of those firms.146  This 
discrimination causes welfare losses “to the degree that less efficient 
                                                 
 142. Id. at 555-56; see also Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on 
International Forum Shopping, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463, 464 (2002) (elucidating that the forum 
non conveniens doctrine “is an American defendant’s primary defense against a forum-
shopping plaintiff ”). 
 143. The impact of domestic court decisions may also affect the public-private 
dimension of forum shopping.  For example, one reason that transnational actors often select 
arbitration rather than litigation as a method of dispute resolution is that the domestic courts 
generally are more likely to enforce foreign arbitral awards than foreign court judgments.  See 
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 1084. 
 144. See MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 127, 127, 131 (2001) (arguing that “jurisdictional rules affect litigation 
costs” and that “[t]he efficient forum is the forum that minimises litigation costs”).  As 
Whincop and Keyes explain, a domestic court can increase the likelihood that a plaintiff will 
make efficient forum choices by making decisions not to assert adjudicative authority when it 
is not the most efficient forum.  Id. at 144. 
 145. Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2008).  For example, he argues that judges’ forum non conveniens 
decisions can help address the problem of welfare-reducing legal discrimination against U.S. 
firms that he identifies in his article.  Id. at 368-70. 
 146. Id. at 340. 
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firms subject to lesser liability displace more efficient firms subject to 
greater liability.”147  Sykes argues that U.S. courts may be able to reduce 
this welfare loss by “limiting foreign tort plaintiffs to the law and 
forum of the jurisdiction in which their harm arose.”148 
 Judicial allocation of prescriptive authority can also affect global 
economic welfare.  According to law and economics theories of choice 
of law, choice of law rules have significant global economic 
consequences.149  Law and economics scholars generally posit one of 
two basic causal mechanisms to explain this relationship, one focusing 
on private conduct, the other on governmental conduct.  First, they 
argue that choice of law rules create incentives for private trans-
national activity:  if well designed, these rules promote transnational 
activity that increases global welfare; if poorly designed, they promote 
transnational activity that decreases global welfare.150  Second, building 
on theories of regulatory competition, they argue that choice of law 
rules create incentives for substantive lawmaking by governments:  
well designed choice of law rules promote adoption of efficient (and 
therefore welfare-enhancing) substantive laws, whereas poorly 
designed choice of law rules facilitate the persistence of inefficient 
substantive laws.151  In effect, law and economics scholars posit an 
explanatory variable, an intervening variable, and a dependent 
variable:  they hypothesize that choice of law rules (the explanatory 
                                                 
 147. Id. at 376. 
 148. Id. at 340. 
 149. See generally WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 144; Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of 
Law:  New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 885-86 (2002); Ralf Michaels, Two Economists, 
Three Opinions?  Economic Models for Private International Law—Cross-Border Torts as 
Example, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 179 (Jürgen 
Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006).  Moreover, some scholars argue that because U.S. 
law generally favors plaintiffs more than foreign law, judicial assertion of U.S. prescriptive 
authority in lawsuits against U.S. businesses arising from activity occurring outside U.S. 
territory may put those businesses at a competitive disadvantage in the global economy.  For 
arguments along these lines, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and 
Global Economic Welfare:  Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (2007); 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245 (2004); Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Tort Litigation as a 
Trade and Investment Issue (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956668.  This reasoning implies that by deferring to the prescriptive 
authority of the state where the activity occurred, domestic courts could avoid this result. 
 150. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 149, at 885-96; Michaels, supra note 149, at 153. 
 151. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 149, at 897; Michaels, supra note 149, at 172 
(noting that from the perspective of an “incentivizing” economic model, “[p]rivate 
international law rules are efficient in such a model if they give incentives to states to pass 
rules that in turn maximize overall efficiency as between individuals”). 
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variable) influence private and governmental behavior (the intervening 
variable), which in turn affects global welfare (the dependent variable). 
 But there is another crucial intervening variable:  domestic 
courts.  The causal chain posited by law and economics scholars 
depends on courts allocating prescriptive authority predictably and in 
accordance with applicable choice of law rules.152  Insofar as domestic 
courts make choice of law decisions unpredictably or inconsistently 
with applicable choice of law rules, those rules are unlikely to have the 
hypothesized behavioral consequences and global economic impact.  
Regarding the predictability of choice of law outcomes, “If people 
cannot ascertain the applicable rule[], or if they have no way of 
knowing the probability that it will cover the conduct they 
contemplate, they are less able to conform their conduct to the rule and 
the state cannot use legal rules to influence their behavior.”153  And if, 
as some skeptics suggest, choice of law rules do not significantly 
affect the choice of law decisions of domestic courts,154 then the 
connection between those rules and the global economy would 
seemingly be weak at best.155  In summary, whether or not choice of 
law rules have the global economic consequences hypothesized by law 
and economics scholars depends on how domestic courts actually 
allocate prescriptive authority and the extent to which they do so in 
accordance with those rules. 
C. Domestic Courts and Other Governance Institutions 
 Domestic courts do not perform their governance functions in 
isolation.  To the contrary, “[A] wide variety of forms of governance 
                                                 
 152. See Michaels, supra note 149, at 156 (explaining that from the perspective of an 
economic private law model, “predictability enables parties to optimise their conduct vis-à-
vis the incentives set by the applicable tort rules”). 
 153. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:  FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 173 
(1991). 
 154. See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, at 83 (“‘[O]f all the factors that may affect 
the outcome of a conflicts case, the factor that is the most inconsequential is the choice-of-
law methodology followed by the court.’” (quoting Symeonides, Choice of Law in American 
Courts in 1994:  A View “from the Trenches,” 43 AM J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995))); Stewart E. 
Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1994) 
(“[C]hoice of law theory exerts at best a marginal influence on choice of law decisions.”).  
But see Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 6, at 764-74 (empirically challenging this 
skeptical view). 
 155. One might argue that formal choice of law doctrine, particularly when it takes the 
form of rules rather than standards, might itself influence strategic behavior independently 
from how domestic courts apply it.  But to the extent that transnational actors have 
information suggesting that domestic courts do not make choice of law decisions in 
accordance with those rules, any such influence would seem to be diminished. 
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exist next to each other.”156  This Subpart analyzes the relationships 
between domestic courts and two other types of global governance 
institutions:  international institutions, such as international law and 
international courts; and transnational private institutions, such as 
transnational contracting and transnational arbitration.  The 
effectiveness of these institutions depends significantly on the support 
of domestic courts. 
1. Domestic Courts and International Institutions 
 When scholars and pundits think about global governance, they 
tend to think primarily about international institutions, such as 
international law and international courts.  But, as this Subpart argues, 
the development of international law, compliance with international 
law, and the effectiveness of international courts all depend 
significantly on domestic courts.  This is another way in which 
domestic courts play a supporting role in global governance.157 
a. Domestic Courts and the Development of International Law 
 Domestic courts contribute to the development of international 
law by ascertaining, interpreting, and, some would say, making 
international law.158  Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice—the most authoritative statement of the sources of 
international law159—specifies that the primary sources of international 
law are international conventions, international custom, and general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.160  Domestic courts 
                                                 
 156. Klaus Dingwerth & Philipp Pattberg, Global Governance as a Perspective on 
World Politics, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185, 192 (2006). 
 157. See CONFORTI, supra note 6, at 8 (“[T]he truly legal function of international law 
essentially is found in the internal legal systems of States.”); FALK, supra note 6, at xi 
(“[I]nternational tribunals are not consistently or conveniently available to resolve most 
disputes involving questions of international law.  Domestic courts can help to overcome this 
structural weakness in the international legal system.”).  In addition to the functions discussed 
below, Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs have drawn attention to the role of domestic 
courts in promoting the accountability of intergovernmental action.  See generally Benvenisti 
& Downs, supra note 6. 
 158. See JANIS, supra note 5, at 81 (“The decisions of judges . . . have played a 
surprisingly important part in the development of international law.”); MURPHY, supra note 
59, at 147 (stating that domestic courts “can be very important in implementing, refining, and 
developing international law”). 
 159. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (4th ed. 1997). 
 160. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1(d), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1157 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
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ascertain international law by analyzing these sources.161  These 
domestic court determinations can be used as evidence of international 
law.162  It is in this sense that judicial decisions are, as article 38 
provides, a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
[international] law.”163  But notwithstanding their subsidiary status,164 
domestic court decisions can be of “immense importance” for 
international law.165  They are, for example, “extremely important in 
clarifying the existence of norms, such as whether a customary rule of 
international law has emerged.”166 
 Domestic courts also contribute to the development of 
international law by interpreting treaties and principles of customary 
international law.167  In litigation under the Alien Tort Statute, U.S. 
courts interpret international law to determine whether alleged torts 
constitute “violation[s] of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”168  Regarding treaties in particular, Benedetto Conforti argues 
that “domestic courts generate a much greater body of case-law 
concerning the interpretation of treaties than do international 
tribunals.”169  U.S. courts routinely interpret treaties in transnational 
litigation.170  In so doing, they give executive branch interpretations 
“great weight,” but executive interpretations are “not conclusive.”171  
                                                 
 161. See JANIS, supra note 5, at 81 (noting that domestic courts “collecting the data 
necessary to establish or explicate rules drawn from the other three (and implicitly higher) 
sources of international law”); MURPHY, supra note 59, at 88 (positing that domestic courts 
“engage in a review of the other sources [of international law] (treaty, custom, general 
principles of law) and then reach conclusions as to what the law is”).  The Supreme Court’s 
classic statement of this judicial function is in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900).  Domestic courts sometimes are also called upon to determine whether or not a state’s 
entry into an international agreement complied with domestic treaty-making rules and, 
consequently, whether a particular treaty is valid international law at all.  See CONFORTI, 
supra note 6, at 84-88 (discussing cases in the United States and Europe where domestic 
courts held that international agreements were not validly concluded under domestic law and 
cases where domestic courts held that they were valid). 
 162. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (5th ed. 1998). 
 163. ICJ Statute, supra note 160.  “Judicial decisions” include decisions of national 
courts.  SHAW, supra note 159, at 87. 
 164. The phrase “subsidiary means” connotes that domestic court decisions are not 
formal sources of international law.  BROWNLIE, supra note 162, at 19. 
 165. SHAW, supra note 159, at 86. 
 166. MURPHY, supra note 59, at 88; see also SHAW, supra note 159, at 87 (noting that 
the decisions of national courts “may provide evidence of customary rules”). 
 167. See MURPHY, supra note 59, at 147. 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 169. CONFORTI, supra note 6, at 104. 
 170. See MURPHY, supra note 59, at 148. 
 171. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982).  However, 
as David Sloss demonstrates, in the early years of U.S. constitutional history, the Supreme 
Court gave virtually no deference to executive branch treaty interpretation.  David Sloss, 
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They also place “considerable weight” on the interpretive decisions of 
the courts of other treaty signatories,172 giving rise to “a corpus of 
national court decisions . . . that implements, refines, and develops 
international law.”173 
 Given the fine line between ascertaining and interpreting 
international law on the one hand, and making international law on the 
other hand, domestic courts arguably play a significant, if 
controversial, role in international law creation.174  Melissa Waters 
describes one process by which this can occur: 
[D]omestic courts and other domestic law-declaring fora articulate or 
champion a particular domestic norm at the transnational level.  The 
norm is then picked up by other transnational actors, thus being 
diffused around the world and becoming part of the international legal 
discourse.  If the norm becomes sufficiently embedded in a large 
number of other domestic or international legal regimes, it becomes the 
dominant normative standard on a given issue.175 
 Domestic courts also contribute to the formation of international 
law insofar as their decisions constitute state practice,176 which, along 
with a sense of legal obligation, is necessary for the establishment of 
customary international law.177  More generally, domestic courts “may 
help mold rules through the collection of evidence of customary 
international law or the general principles of law.”178 
                                                                                                             
Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations:  A Historical Perspective, 62 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498-99 (2007). 
 172. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (stating that “we ‘find the 
opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable weight’” and referring to a 
French court’s decision to interpret the term “accident” in the Warsaw Convention on 
International Transportation by Air (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 
913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978))). 
 173. MURPHY, supra note 59, at 149. 
 174. See JANIS, supra note 5, at 82 (“[T]he judge’s . . . most controversial function in 
international law has to do with rule formation, the role that most impinges upon the power of 
sovereign states.”). 
 175. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity:  The Role of Transnational 
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 503 (2005); 
see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree:  International Review of National 
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2123 (2004) (arguing that through a process of dialectical 
review, domestic courts interact with international courts in a manner that leads to the 
development of international norms). 
 176. See CONFORTI, supra note 6, at 79; SHAW, supra note 159, at 88. 
 177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) (1987). 
 178. JANIS, supra note 6, at 82. 
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b. Domestic Courts and Compliance with International Law 
 Two of the principal mechanisms of state compliance with 
international law depend heavily on domestic courts:  enforcement and 
internalization.179  Thus domestic courts can either facilitate or hinder 
compliance with international law.180  Domestic courts contribute to 
enforcement when they determine whether conduct violates 
international law.181  The paradigmatic example of this mechanism is 
decentralized enforcement of EU law through the domestic courts of 
EU member states.182  According to the doctrines of supremacy and 
direct effect of EU law, member states’ courts not only give priority to 
EU law in conflicts with domestic law, but also allow private litigants 
to sue member states for violating EU law.183  Even U.S. courts have 
frequently applied a presumption in favor of judicial enforceability of 
treaty-based rights, although the status of this presumption is 
contested.184  The key point is that “compliance with international law 
relies not so much on enforcement mechanisms available at the 
international level, but rather on the resolve of domestic legal operators 
                                                 
 179. Of course, not only courts, but also other domestic institutions, including 
executive and legislative institutions, and domestic politics more generally, play an important 
role in determining levels of compliance.  See, e.g., Miles Kahler, Conclusion:  The Causes 
and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 661, 673-77 (2000) (discussing the 
consequences of domestic institutions and domestic politics for compliance with international 
law). 
 180. See Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 254 (describing transnational public law litigation 
as “a means of marshaling the resources of national courts in order to enhance global 
compliance with international law”). 
 181. See MURPHY, supra note 59. 
 States might absorb into their national law the international commitment, 
such that the international obligation merges into a national obligation.  When this 
happens, national laws, regulations, and courts become available to strengthen 
compliance with the international commitment. . . .  Once the international norm 
becomes operative in national law, national courts may become available for 
enforcement, including though [sic] action filed by individuals. . . .  The overall 
effect is for the international obligation to become embedded in the national legal 
system, thereby allowing the use of that system . . . to promote compliance. 
Id. at 163. 
 182. See Tanja A. Börzel, Participation Through Law Enforcement:  The Case of the 
European Union, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 128, 134-35 (2006). 
 183. RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 70-78 (2005). 
 184. See generally David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable 
Rights?  The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 20 (2006) (arguing against the claim that there is a presumption that treaties 
do not create judicially enforceable individual rights, and arguing that between 1789 and 
1975, the Supreme Court frequently applied a presumption in favor of domestic judicial 
remedies and that the current status of this presumption remains unresolved). 
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such as . . . judges to use to their limits the mechanisms provided by 
municipal law to ensure compliance with international norms.”185 
 But enforcement is not the only path toward compliance with 
international law.  According to transnational legal process theory, an 
even more fundamental process leading to compliance is 
internalization.186  As Harold Koh argues, the key to compliance—or, 
as he calls it, “obedience”—is a process of “interaction and 
interpretation whereby international norms become domesticated and 
internalized into domestic law.”187  One of the principal forms of 
internalization is judicial internalization, whereby “litigation in 
domestic courts provokes judicial incorporation of international law 
norms into domestic law, statutes, or constitutional norms.”188  By 
incorporating international law, domestic courts can promote 
internalization and enhance compliance; by declining to do so, they 
can frustrate internalization and hinder compliance. 
c. Domestic Courts and the Effectiveness of International 
Courts 
 The effectiveness of international courts also depends signifi-
cantly on domestic courts.  As a general proposition, levels of 
compliance with the decisions of an international court are likely to be 
higher when the international court is embedded in domestic legal 
systems.189  An important dimension of embeddedness is the ability 
and willingness of domestic courts to recognize and enforce the 
judgments of the international court.190  This aspect of embeddedness 
can vary, with compliance increasing as domestic courts become more 
able or willing to recognize and enforce international court judgments.  
                                                 
 185. CONFORTI, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
 186. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. 
L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing IL Home] (outlining transnational legal 
process theory); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2599, 2657 (1997) (same). 
 187. Koh, Bringing IL Home, supra note 186, at 636. 
 188. Id. at 643. 
 189. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:  
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 131 (2008). 
 190. Id. at 133 (“Embeddedness . . . significantly improves the prospects for 
compliance with the European Convention [on Human Rights] . . . by enabling national 
courts to protect the Convention’s civil and political liberties . . . .”); Robert O. Keohane, 
Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution:  Interstate and 
Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 468-70 (2000) (defining the “embeddedness” of an 
international legal system in terms of the ability of national courts to enforce international 
judgments against their own governments). 
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When a domestic court accepts an international court ruling, the 
compliance pull of that ruling becomes particularly strong:  
“[G]overnments find it much harder to disobey their own courts 
compared to international tribunals.”191  Thus, by accepting (or not 
accepting) international court decisions, domestic courts can facilitate 
(or hinder) efforts to govern transnational activity through international 
courts. 
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the EU’s principal judicial 
organ, owes its effectiveness largely to the domestic courts of EU 
member states.192  In fact, the ECJ “deliberately wooed national 
courts,”193 encouraging them to refer questions of EU law to it under 
the EU’s preliminary reference procedure and to apply its 
interpretations of that law.194  Not all EU member state governments 
were eager to accept the ECJ’s authority.195  But by obtaining the 
support of domestic courts, the ECJ increased the likelihood of 
member state compliance with its rulings:  governments may have 
been willing to ignore the ECJ, but they were not willing to ignore 
their own national courts.196  As one EU law expert puts it, “the outer 
limits of the [ECJ’s] authority and credibility are really to be found 
among the national judiciaries” of EU members.197 
 There is nothing inevitable about domestic court support for 
international courts.  In the EU context, member states’ domestic 
courts use references to the ECJ to challenge domestic law, but they 
“also use domestic legal avenues to challenge ECJ jurisprudence with 
which they disagree.”198  And in the United States, a practical 
                                                 
 191. J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution:  The European Court of Justice and Its 
Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 519 (1994). 
 192. See FOLSOM, supra note 183, at 87-88. 
 193. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 387 (1997). 
 194. See Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 135, at 66. 
 195. ALTER, supra note 7, at 219-20. 
 196. Id. at 63.  As Alter argues, “National judicial support gives the ECJ greater 
autonomy from states . . . because if the ECJ can carry the support of national courts, it can 
be confident that its decisions will be accepted by national governments.”  Id. 
 197. Ralph H. Folsom, Law-Making and Litigation in the European Union, in 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER MAASTRICHT:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE 
COMMON MARKET 24 (Ralph H. Folsom, Ralph B. Lake & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1996); see also 
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES:  CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 164 
(2000) (“The success of the ECJ’s gambit depended heavily on the willingness of national 
judges to use the article 177 [preliminary reference] procedure, and to faithfully implement 
the ECJ’s interpretations of EC law.”). 
 198. ALTER, supra note 7, at 61; see also id. at 63 (“[T]he support of national courts 
cannot be assumed, and maintaining this support is not easy.  In the final analysis national 
courts are still loyal to their constitutions and to domestic political concerns.”). 
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consequence of the Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in Medellin v. Texas 
that decisions of the ICJ are not directly enforceable in the United 
States may be to hinder efforts to have the ICJ play a leading role in 
governing consular affairs under the Vienna Convention.199 
 Using courts like the ECJ as case studies, scholars of comparative 
politics and international relations have highlighted the transformative 
effects that international courts can have on global governance.200  But 
the foregoing analysis suggests that whether international courts are 
likely to have such effects depends largely on whether they enjoy the 
support of domestic courts. 
d. The Relationship Between Domestic Courts and 
International Institutions 
 What does the foregoing analysis mean for the relationship 
between domestic courts and international institutions?  On the one 
hand, the analysis suggests that the success of efforts to govern 
transnational activity through international law and international courts 
depends significantly on the support of domestic courts.  By offering 
such support, domestic courts can facilitate these efforts; by denying it, 
they can hinder them.  In this sense, domestic courts play an important 
role in global governance through international institutions. 
 But domestic courts are not, of course, the only actors upon 
which the efficacy of international institutions depends.201  Moreover, 
the relationship between domestic courts and international institutions 
is not one-way:  the latter can also provide support for the former.  For 
example, international agreements dealing with transnational 
litigation—such as the Hague Service Convention202 and the Hague 
Evidence Convention203—facilitate the contributions of domestic 
                                                 
 199. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); see also Martinez, supra note 6, at 494 (“U.S. courts 
applying international law will sometimes follow decisions of international courts on relevant 
issues.  But sometimes, they do not . . . .”). 
 200. See, e.g., COURTS CROSSING BORDERS:  BLURRING THE LINES OF SOVEREIGNTY, 
supra note 7; Rachel A. Cichowski, Introduction:  Courts, Democracy, and Governance, 39 
COMP. POL. STUD. 3, 7 (2006). 
 201. See CONFORTI, supra note 6, at 8-9 (discussing not only the role of domestic 
courts, but also other “domestic legal operators”); Koh, Bringing IL Home, supra note 186, at 
649-51 (including not only domestic courts, but also legislatures, nongovernmental 
organizations, and other entities as “law-declaring fora” that contribute to the internalization 
of international norms). 
 202. The Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 
163. 
 203. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 
U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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courts to global governance by providing mechanisms for mutual 
assistance in transnational litigation.  In the EU, the preliminary 
reference procedure not only enhances the ECJ’s authority, but also 
supports the domestic courts of EU member states by helping them 
resolve issues of EU law.  And while the domestic courts of EU 
member states may have played a central role in the construction of the 
EU legal system, it was two legal principles developed by the ECJ—
the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of EU law—that provided 
doctrinal foundations for that role.204 
 In summary, it is impossible to have a sound understanding of 
international institutions—particularly international law and inter-
national courts—without a sound understanding of their relationships 
with domestic courts.  Conversely, to understand the role of domestic 
courts in global governance, one must understand how this role relates 
to international institutions. 
2. Domestic Courts and Transnational Private Institutions 
 Legal scholars and political scientists have highlighted the 
growing role of private institutions in global governance.205  This 
Subpart argues that the effectiveness of these institutions, like that of 
international institutions, depends significantly on the support of 
domestic courts.  For example, transnational contracting and trans- 
national arbitration rely on domestic courts. 
a. Domestic Courts and Transnational Contracting 
 A basic transnational private institution is transnational 
contracting.206  Contractually governed activity creates a demand for 
third-party dispute resolution.207  Without third-party dispute 
resolution, “the costs of exchange may be prohibitive, since each 
prospective party may doubt that the other will abide by promises 
                                                 
 204. See Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 135, at 66 (claiming that by announcing 
the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of EC law, “the ECJ supplied national courts 
with enhanced means of guaranteeing the effectiveness of EC law”). 
 205. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY:  
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003); HALL & 
BIERSTEKER, supra note 90; Tim Büthe, Governance Through Private Authority:  Non-State 
Actors in World Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281 (2004); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global 
Private Governance:  Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2005); Walter Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy:  
From Litigation to Arbitration, 55 INT’L ORG. 919 (2001). 
 206. See STONE SWEET, supra note 197, at 14. 
 207. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 135, at 63-64. 
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made over the life of the contract.”208  By providing transnational 
dispute resolution services, domestic courts help meet this demand, 
providing important support for transnational contracting as a form of 
private governance.  But insofar as domestic courts decline to enforce 
transnational contracts, they can hinder efforts to govern transnational 
activity through private contracting. 
b. Domestic Courts and Transnational Arbitration209 
 Domestic courts are not, however, the only providers of 
transnational dispute resolution services.  An alternative is 
transnational arbitration.  Transnational arbitration is dispute resolution 
by a private actor (the arbitrator) pursuant to the agreement of the 
disputants to submit their dispute to arbitration.210  As such, trans-
national arbitration is a form of transnational private governance.211  By 
providing transnational dispute resolution services, transnational arbi-
tration can facilitate governance through transnational contracting.212 
 But transnational arbitration itself depends significantly on 
domestic courts.  This point was recognized by the architects of the 
modern system of transnational arbitration,213 and embodied in articles 
II and III of the United Nations Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), 
which creates a general rule in favor of judicial enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, subject only to specified 
exceptions.214  Today, there is a widespread understanding that 
                                                 
 208. Id. at 64. 
 209. For a more comprehensive statement of this Part’s argument, see Whytock, supra 
note 18, at 464-69. 
 210. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 1083. 
 211. See Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 
13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627, 627 (2006) (arguing that together transnational arbitration and lex 
mercatoria constitute emerging private system of governance). 
 212. Cf. Shapiro & Stone Sweet, supra note 7, at 323, 328-39 (noting that traders can 
choose between state and nonstate dispute resolution to facilitate their contractual 
exchanges). 
 213. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 
1958:  TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 1 (1981) (calling the New York 
Convention the “cornerstone of current international commercial arbitration”); Thomas E. 
Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773, 774-75 (2002) 
(“Sovereign state cooperation was indispensible to instituting the process.  [Transnational 
commercial arbitration] needed the approbation of states to benefit from municipal courts’ 
status of legitimacy and their authority in order to function effectively as a transborder 
system.”). 
 214. Exceptions to the general rule in favor of enforcement of arbitration agreements 
are in article II, and exceptions to the general rule in favor of enforcement of arbitral awards 
are in articles V and VI. 
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transnational arbitration depends on domestic courts, particularly for 
enforcement.215 
 This does not mean that arbitration agreements and arbitral 
awards necessarily go unheeded without judicial recourse.  Rather, 
because domestic courts generally have narrowly construed the New 
York Convention’s exceptions to enforcement,216 transnational actors 
expect domestic courts to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral 
awards, and are therefore more likely to comply with them 
voluntarily.217  It is as much by creating these expectations as by 
providing enforcement in particular cases that domestic courts support 
arbitration as a system of transnational private governance.218  In fact, 
one reason for the tremendous growth of transnational arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation is that transnational actors perceive that 
domestic courts are more likely to enforce arbitral awards than foreign 
court judgments.219 
 Judicial support of transnational arbitration is not inevitable, 
however.  Insofar as they are reluctant to enforce arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards, domestic courts may hinder rather 
than facilitate this private form of governance.  Indeed, one recent 
empirical analysis suggests that in published decisions, U.S. courts 
may not be as likely to enforce transnational arbitral awards as often as 
                                                 
 215. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION:  BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 107 (1992) (arguing that 
arbitration relies on domestic courts); Carbonneau, supra note 213, at 801-03 (same); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 519 
(1995) (same); Wai, supra note 6, at 247 (same).  In theory, as an alternative to judicial 
enforcement, private enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards might be 
possible based on reputational sanctions.  Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration in the Shadow of the 
Law, in 1 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 95 (Peter Newman 
ed., 1998); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373 (1990); Stone Sweet, supra note 212, at 325.  In practice, however, this is likely only 
in relatively small, well-defined and enduring communities in which actors have long time 
horizons and are able to monitor each other closely.  Whytock, supra note 18, at 464-69. 
 216. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS:  PLANNING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 113 (1999); BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra 
note 20, at 1111 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)). 
 217. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation Relationship in 
Transnational Dispute Resolution:  Empirical Insights from the U.S. Federal Courts, 2 
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 39, 74 (2008) (finding that the U.S. district courts enforce 
arbitration awards covered by the New York Convention more often than not in published 
decisions). 
 218. Whytock, supra note 18, at 464-69. 
 219. Cf. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 20, at 1084 (“[I]nternational arbitration is 
often seen as a means of obtaining an award that is more readily enforceable than a national 
court judgment.”). 
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commonly believed.220  The important point is that, depending on their 
decisions, domestic courts can either support or undermine arbitration 
as a form of transnational private governance. 
c. The Relationship Between Domestic Courts and 
Transnational Private Institutions 
 The foregoing analysis suggests that the success of efforts to 
govern transnational activity through transnational private institutions 
depends significantly on the support of domestic courts.  By providing 
support—for example, by enforcing contracts, arbitration agreements, 
and arbitral awards—domestic courts can facilitate transnational 
private governance.  By withholding this support, they can hinder it.  
Domestic courts thus play a foundational role in global governance 
through transnational private institutions. 
 But domestic courts also critically depend on private actors.  
Because courts generally cannot act on their own initiative, they 
depend on litigants to give them opportunities to make authoritative 
decisions.221  Private plaintiffs play an important role in activating 
transnational litigation, and it is in transnational litigation that domestic 
courts perform their primary global governance functions.222  
Therefore, beyond understanding transnational judicial governance 
and transnational private governance as distinct forms of global 
governance, it is important to understand the complex two-way 
relationship between them.223 
                                                 
 220. See Whytock, supra note 217, at 74 (finding that the full enforcement rate in 
published U.S. federal court decisions involving awards covered by the New York Convention 
is 73.9% and that in 3.0% of such decisions “the court either partially enforced an award or 
stayed enforcement proceedings”). 
 221. See SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 7, at 293 (“[L]itigants activate courts 
. . . .”); Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age:  Public Interests 
in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219 (2001) (discussing the 
role of private litigants in judicial regulation of transnational economic activity); Cichowski, 
supra note 200, at 7 (“[E]xtending public access to courts can increase citizen and interest 
group participation in the development, monitoring, and enforcement of laws . . . .”). 
 222. For example, the domestic courts of EU member states play a fundamental role in 
the EU legal system, but this role depends importantly on the willingness of private parties to 
litigate EU issues in those courts.  See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 7; STONE SWEET, supra note 7, 
at 263-64; Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court:  A Political Theory 
of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993). 
 223. Cf. Büthe, supra note 205, at 284 (“This leaves the question[s]:  What is the role 
of the state in this empowerment of private actors?  And can states take back the authority 
thus granted to private actors? . . .  Does the increase in private authority have a lasting effect 
on the role of states in international governance?”). 





2009] DOMESTIC COURTS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 115 
 
IV. GOVERNANCE-ORIENTED ANALYSIS 
 This Article has argued that domestic courts play an important 
role in global governance.224  But because scholars have devoted 
relatively little attention to this role, we know little about how domestic 
courts behave as global governors, why they govern the way they do, 
and how they affect transnational activity.225  This lack of understanding 
prevents sound critical evaluation of the contributions of domestic 
courts to global governance and well-informed decisions about the 
most appropriate governance arrangements for different realms of 
transnational activity.  This Part argues that to address this gap in 
knowledge, scholars should do two things.  First, they should analyze 
not only transnational legal doctrine, but also transnational law in 
action.  Second, they should move beyond litigant-oriented 
perspectives to analysis of the transnational shadow of the law.  This 
approach—which this Article calls “governance-oriented analysis”—
has descriptive, positive-theoretical, and normative goals.226 
A. Methodological Characteristics 
 Governance-oriented analysis has two basic methodological 
characteristics:  a focus on transnational law in action as a complement 
to doctrinal analysis and a focus on the transnational shadow of the law 
as a complement to litigant-oriented analysis. 
1. Transnational Law in Action:  Governance-Oriented Analysis as a 
Complement to Doctrinal Analysis 
 Resisting preoccupation with international law, Philip Jessup 
argued in 1956 for an alternative conception of “the law applicable to 
the complex interrelated world community.”227  He proposed the 
concept of “transnational law,” which he defined as the body of law 
that “regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers,” a 
concept meant to embody both public and private international law.228  
Challenging the distinction between national and international as a 
                                                 
 224. Supra Parts II-III. 
 225. But see sources cited supra note 6 (describing related prior scholarship). 
 226. For examples of governance-oriented analysis, see Whytock, supra note 18 
(preliminary governance-oriented analysis of transnational arbitration); Whytock, supra note 
217 (same); Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 6 (governance-oriented analysis of 
international choice of law).  Tonya Putnam’s important study of extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law, supra note 6, also has the attributes of governance-oriented analysis. 
 227. JESSUP, supra note 15, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 228. Id. at 2. 
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basis for legal classification, he also specifically included in his 
definition domestic legal rules that apply to transnational activity.229  
The definition of transnational law thus explicitly recognizes that 
domestic legal doctrine can have transnational implications. 
 Governance-oriented analysis complements the study of 
transnational legal doctrine with analysis of transnational law in 
action—that is, analysis of how domestic courts actually interpret and 
apply transnational law to allocate governance authority and determine 
rights and obligations of transnational actors.230 
 The underlying assumption is that legal doctrine alone does not 
adequately account for what judges do.231  In this way, governance-
oriented analysis extends core realist insights to transnational law232 
and also has an affinity with the New Haven school of international 
law, which seeks to provide, “in lieu of anecdotal historicism, for the 
systematic description of past trends in decision in terms of their 
approximations to clarified goals.”233 
 To analyze transnational law in action, governance-oriented 
analysis uses qualitative and statistical methods of descriptive and 
                                                 
 229. Id. at 70, 106. 
 230. See Pound, supra note 15, at 15 (illustrating the importance of the distinction 
between “law in books” and “law in action”). 
 231. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992) (reviewing and refining empirical 
analyses, suggesting that nonlegal factors, including judges’ ideological attitudes, also 
influence judicial decision making). 
 232. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236-37 (1931) (attributing to the legal realist movement a 
“[d]istrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they purport to describe what 
either courts or people are actually doing” and “a distrust of the theory that traditional 
prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions”).  
Although my approach is indeed skeptical insofar as it treats the extent and nature of the 
influence of legal rules on the decisions of courts and other actors as questions to be 
investigated empirically in various settings rather than things to be assumed, my approach 
takes seriously the role of transnational law in influencing the behavior of domestic courts as 
global governors.  As Llewellyn himself emphasized, “‘distrust’ in this . . . point is not at all 
equivalent to ‘negation in any given instance.’”  Id. at 1237; see also Howard Erlanger et al., 
Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 343 (“[L]egal realism originally 
had a purely domestic focus, but now it is impossible for legal scholars to ignore transnational 
issues and arenas.  One of the key tests of New Legal Realism will be its success in taking on 
major issues involved with the so-called ‘globalization of law.’”); Gregory Shaffer, A New 
Legal Realism:  Method in International Economic Law Scholarship, in INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW—THE STATE & FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE (Colin B. Picker, Isabella Bunn & 
Douglas Arner eds., 2009) (discussing new legal realist approaches to the analysis of 
international economic law). 
 233. Myres S. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law:  
A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 337, 344 (1960). 
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causal inference234 and draws on positive theories of judicial decision 
making developed by political scientists and legal scholars.235  Analysis 
based solely on anecdotal examples or “big” cases is unlikely to be 
reliable.  What is needed instead is systematic examination of broad 
patterns of judicial decision making in transnational litigation, 
particularly decision making by the lower courts, which are on the 
front lines of transnational litigation.236 
 With its focus on transnational law in action, domestic court 
decision making is a key dependent variable in governance-oriented 
analysis.  Yet just as an exclusive focus on transnational legal doctrine 
is insufficient from a governance-oriented perspective, so is an 
exclusive focus on law in action.  To adopt the Holmesean equation of 
law with “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact”237 is to 
conflate what the governance-oriented approach wants to explain (the 
behavior of courts as global governors) with a potentially important 
explanatory variable (legal doctrine), making inferences about 
doctrinal effects impossible.238  Likewise, because there are important 
actors other than courts that influence and are influenced by 
transnational law, an exclusive focus on courts is insufficient.  Thus, 
governance-oriented analysis emphasizes transnational law in action, 
particularly domestic court decision making in transnational 
litigation—but it does so as a complement to, not a substitute for, 
doctrinal analysis and analysis of the legal behavior of noncourt actors. 
                                                 
 234. See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY:  SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ch. 2 (1994); Lee Epstein & Gary 
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-37 (2002) (explaining these methods). 
 235. See generally George & Epstein, supra note 231 (discussing these theories). 
 236. For steps in this direction, see, for example, Jeffrey Davis, Justice Without 
Borders:  Human Rights Cases in U.S. Courts, 28 LAW & POL’Y 60 (2006) (explaining judicial 
decision making in Alien Tort Statute claims); Putnam, supra note 6 (extraterritorial 
application of domestic law by U.S. courts); Kirk A. Randazzo, When Liberty and Security 
Collide:  Foreign Policy Litigation and the Federal Judiciary, 94 KY. L.J. 629 (2005-2006) 
(decisions balancing national security and individual rights); Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra 
note 6 (international choice of law decision making by U.S. district courts); Whytock, supra 
note 217 (transnational arbitral award enforcement decisions by U.S. district courts). 
 237. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). 
 238. Cf. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 892 (1998) (“Because one central question of norms 
research is the effect of norms on state behavior, it is important to operationalize a norm in a 
way that is distinct from the state or nonstate behavior it is designed to explain.”).  Holmes’ 
approach is also problematic because the common conception of the rule of law as including 
among its values judicial decision making in accordance with recognized legal principles 
becomes incoherent if judicial decision making and law are not kept analytically distinct. 





118 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:67 
 
2. The Transnational Shadow of the Law:  Governance-Oriented 
Analysis as a Complement to Litigant-Oriented Analysis 
 Unsurprisingly, legal scholarship tends to focus on the 
implications of court decisions for litigants.  But the global governance 
functions of domestic courts are important not only because of their 
impact on litigants, but also—and perhaps even more importantly—
because of their influence beyond the parties to particular lawsuits and 
beyond state borders.239  Therefore, to understand the role of domestic 
courts in global governance, scholars must complement litigant-
oriented analysis with analysis of the transnational shadow of the law.  
This is the second methodological characteristic of governance-
oriented analysis. 
 To understand the transnational shadow of the law is to 
understand cause-and-effect relationships:  domestic court decision 
making is an explanatory variable that affects transnational activity.240  
How are scholars to improve their understanding of these 
relationships?  Again, qualitative and statistical methods of inference 
must play a central role.  Empirical scholarship by economists and 
political scientists on comparative political economy provides some 
clues about how these methods might be applied to shed light on the 
transnational shadow of the law.241  Among other things, these scholars 
have developed and empirically tested hypotheses about the 
relationships between cross-national variations in corporate and 
securities laws and corporate valuations,242 and between cross-national 
differences in the quality of domestic legal institutions on the one hand 
and international trade flows243 and foreign direct investment244 on the 
other hand.  A major difference between these approaches and 
                                                 
 239. See discussion supra Part III. 
 240. Although I am highlighting the question of causation, there may also be 
important constitutive dimensions to the relationship between domestic courts and 
transnational actors. 
 241. See generally Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality Seriously in 
Comparative Constitutional Law:  Insights from Comparative Politics and Comparative 
Political Economy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2008) (reviewing empirical work on 
comparative political economy). 
 242. See, e.g., Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial 
Development (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3136, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636556. 
 243. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz et al., Legal Institutions and International Trade 
Flows, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 163 (2004). 
 244. See, e.g., Christian Daude & Ernesto Stein, The Quality of Institutions and 
Foreign Direct Investment, 19 ECON. & POL. 317 (2007); Amanda Perry, Effective Legal 
Systems and Foreign Direct Investment:  In Search of the Evidence, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
779 (2000). 
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governance-oriented analysis of transnational law is that the former 
often use formal laws and static descriptions of legal institutions as 
explanatory variables, whereas governance-oriented analysis should 
emphasize theoretically relevant categories of domestic court decision 
making as explanatory variables.245  Nevertheless, empirical 
comparative political economy scholarship suggests that this 
dimension of governance-oriented analysis is promising. 
 An implication of the focus on the transnational shadow of the 
law is that published court decisions are particularly relevant to 
governance-oriented analysis.  It is well known that most court 
decisions are unpublished and that published decisions are not 
necessarily representative of the overall population of published and 
unpublished decisions.246  But beyond the litigants in particular lawsuits, 
transnational actors are unlikely to have knowledge of unpublished 
decisions.247  For domestic court decisions to affect the strategic 
behavior of transnational actors, those actors must have knowledge of 
those decisions.248  Therefore, the published decisions of domestic 
courts are likely to have broader global governance implications than 
those that are unpublished. 
 The direct consequences of domestic court decisions in particular 
lawsuits for the parties to those lawsuits are also very important.249  
Thus, analysis of the transnational shadow of the law is a complement 
to, not a substitute for, litigant-oriented analysis. 
                                                 
 245. See, e.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 243, at 171 (using International Country 
Risk Guide data on the quality of domestic legal institutions); Daude & Stein, supra note 244, 
at 321-23, 330 (discussing their use of regulatory quality, rule of law, and legal family 
variables). 
 246. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 125-26. 
 247. Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions:  A Hard Look at the 
Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 96-97 (2004) (“The parties, not the larger legal 
community, are said to be the primary audience” for unpublished decisions; an unpublished 
decision “‘is, more or less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts,’ [in which] 
only a minimal or truncated fact statement is necessary [and] the law . . . need not be stated 
elaborately,” and which “‘is not written in a way that will be fully intelligible to those 
unfamiliar with the case.’” (citing Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 
2001))); Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law:  Unpublication in the District Courts 11 (Jan. 
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1006101 (“[U]npublished district court opinions are not meaningfully available for review 
and study by anyone.”). 
 248. See discussion supra Part II.A.  However, it is possible that by deciding not to 
publish decisions, domestic courts affect the strategic behavior of transnational actors by 
increasing uncertainty about future court decisions.  I thank Christian Ford for pointing this 
out. 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114 (describing these consequences). 
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B. Descriptive, Positive-Theoretical, and Normative Goals 
 Governance-oriented analysis has descriptive, positive-
theoretical, and normative goals.  Descriptively, the goal is to shed 
light on how domestic courts behave as global governors.  This is the 
first step toward improving our knowledge of the contributions of 
domestic courts to global governance.  For example, how often do 
domestic courts make decisions that allocate global governance 
authority or determine rights and obligations of transnational actors?  
How often do domestic courts defer to the authority of foreign states, 
international institutions, or private institutions rather than asserting 
domestic state authority?  How do the answers to these questions vary 
over time, cross-nationally, between trial and appellate courts and, 
within the United States, between state and federal courts?250 
 In terms of positive theory, the goal is to develop and empirically 
test theories explaining why domestic courts govern the way they do 
and explaining the transnational shadow effects of their decisions.  For 
example, which factors—both legal and nonlegal—influence whether 
domestic courts defer to foreign, international, or private authority 
rather than asserting domestic state authority?  Which factors influence 
how domestic courts determine rights and obligations of transnational 
actors?  In what ways and under what circumstances do domestic court 
decisions affect transnational activity, the global economy, and the 
effectiveness of other governance institutions, from international law 
and international courts, to transnational contracting and transnational 
arbitration? 
 Normatively, governance-oriented analysis seeks to evaluate 
critically the contributions of domestic courts to global governance, 
with the ultimate goal of comparing these contributions to those of 
other institutions and identifying the governance arrangements that are 
                                                 
 250. The question of cross-national differences is particularly important.  The concepts 
developed in this Article are intended to be sufficiently general to be analytically useful 
across different legal systems.  However, the examples used in this Article are drawn 
primarily from the U.S. legal system and, to a lesser extent, the EU legal system.  Cross-
national empirical research will be needed to determine just how well these concepts can 
travel from state to state.  Recent scholarship suggests that the role of domestic courts in 
global governance extends beyond U.S. courts.  See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 6, at 
380-83 (surveying involvement of national courts inside and outside the United States in 
fostering democratic accountability in global governance).  However, because of the 
possibility that U.S. courts may exert greater or different influences, generalizations must be 
made with caution.  See Brand, supra note 110, at 115 (“Private litigation is used in the 
United States in ways not common or even possible in other countries.”); Stephen B. 
Burbank, All the World His Stage, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 262 (2008) (noting “unique role of 
litigation in the United States”). 
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most appropriate for different realms of transnational activity.  Here, 
the distinction between transnational legal doctrine and transnational 
law in action is particularly important, for it provides a lens for 
evaluating not only what transnational law says, but also how domestic 
courts apply it to reach real-world outcomes. 
 The normative questions are many:  Is it a good thing that 
domestic courts play an important role in global governance?251  Do 
domestic courts perform their global governance functions in a 
cosmopolitan or parochial manner?  Do they foster or undermine 
transnational rule of law?  Do their decisions increase or decrease 
global economic welfare?  And what are the implications for 
fundamental political values such as separation of powers, democracy, 
and state sovereignty? 
 In fact, a debate is already emerging over issues like these.  On 
the one hand, Hannah Buxbaum argues that “transnational regulatory 
litigation can, under proper circumstances, enable national courts to 
participate in implementing effective regulatory strategies for global 
markets.”252  Likewise, Harold Koh argues that “transnational public 
law litigation represents a positive development, designed to further 
the protection of international human rights and to return U.S. courts to 
their proper, but neglected role, as guardians of international law.”253 
 Others are less optimistic, arguing that using domestic litigation 
to address global issues carries substantial costs.  For example, Austen 
Parrish argues that insofar as domestic courts attempt to solve global 
problems by applying domestic law extraterritorially, they pose 
significant threats to notions of democratic sovereignty.254  Curtis 
Bradley argues that international human rights litigation in U.S. courts 
creates significant costs for U.S. foreign relations, U.S. democracy, and 
the international system.255  Tanja Börzel suggests that domestic courts 
may reinforce the advantages of the “haves” over the “have nots” in 
transnational relations.256 
                                                 
 251. A panel coorganized by the author explicitly addressed this question at the Joint 
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Canadian Law and Society 
Association, Montreal, Canada, June 1, 2008. 
 252. Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 316. 
 253. Koh, supra note 106, at 3; see also Wai, supra note 6, at 244 (“[T]ransnational 
litigation of private law claims in national courts could constitute part of a plural regime for 
the governance of transnational economic activity . . . .”). 
 254. Parrish, supra note 44, at 6. 
 255. Bradley, supra note 16, at 457-58. 
 256. Börzel, supra note 182, at 132 (arguing that transnational litigation in domestic 
courts may be an important tool for vindicating international rights, but those actors who 
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 The quality of this emerging debate ultimately depends on a 
sound understanding of how domestic courts actually make decisions 
in transnational litigation and how those decisions affect transnational 
activity.  The descriptive, positive-theoretical, and normative goals of 
governance-oriented analysis are thus closely related:  the importance 
of the normative questions reinforces the importance of the descriptive 
and positive-theoretical endeavors, and the answers to the normative 
questions depend in part on the knowledge gained in those endeavors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Domestic courts are global governors.  They provide support for 
transnational activity by allocating governance authority among states, 
between domestic and international institutions, and between public 
and private institutions. They also determine rights and obligations of 
transnational actors.  By performing these global governance 
functions, domestic courts exert an influence that extends beyond the 
parties to particular lawsuits and beyond borders.  Their decisions 
affect the strategic behavior of transnational actors and global 
economic welfare.  And they can either support or hinder efforts to 
govern transnational activity through international institutions, such as 
international law and international courts, and private institutions, such 
as transnational contracting and transnational arbitration.  The 
effectiveness of these alternative governance arrangements depends 
significantly on the support of domestic courts. 
 Yet scholars have devoted relatively little attention to the role of 
domestic courts in global governance.  As a result, we know very little 
about how domestic courts behave as global governors, why they 
govern the way they do, and how they affect transnational activity.  
Governance-oriented analysis—which combines doctrinal analysis 
with analysis of transnational law in action and blends litigant-oriented 
analysis with analysis of behavior in the transnational shadow of the 
law—can help scholars address this gap in knowledge, and develop the 
empirical foundations needed for a sound debate about the role of 
domestic courts in the world. 
 Governance-oriented analysis can also contribute to several 
existing areas of scholarship.  By shedding empirical light on the role 
of domestic courts in global governance, it can contribute to 
scholarship that examines alternatives to international institutions as 
                                                                                                             
would benefit most from this strategy are the least likely to exploit them because they may 
have domestic court access but lack the necessary resources to use it). 
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mechanisms for regulating transnational activity;257 to the emerging 
body of interdisciplinary international law-international relations 
scholarship that highlights the importance of domestic actors;258 and to 
research on judicialization,259 which so far has explored the role of 
domestic courts in domestic governance260 and international courts in 
global governance,261 but not the role of domestic courts in global 
governance.  By elucidating the role of domestic courts in the 
allocation of adjudicative, prescriptive, and enforcement authority and 
in the development and implementation of international law, 
governance-oriented analysis can contribute empirically to traditional 
international law and conflict-of-laws scholarship.  By showing how 
domestic courts can facilitate or hinder the effectiveness of 
international courts, it can contribute to recent scholarship on the 
emergence of an international judicial system.262  And by improving 
our understanding of the relationship between domestic courts and 
private forms of governance, it can contribute to research on global 
legal pluralism.263 
 Most importantly, with improved knowledge of transnational 
judicial governance, scholars and policy makers can better evaluate the 
contributions of domestic courts to global governance and compare 
those contributions with those of other institutions.  Ultimately, such 
knowledge can help identify which governance arrangements are most 
appropriate for different realms of transnational activity, and which 
arrangements are best able to maximize the benefits and mitigate the 
costs of globalization. 
                                                 
 257. See, e.g., Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 24 (comparing interstate, transgovern-
mental, and private forms of global governance). 
 258. See, e.g., Kahler, supra note 179, at 674-77 (describing the role of domestic 
“compliance constituencies” in international legal system); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William 
Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 
47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327 (2006) (same). 
 259. On the concept of judicialization, see generally HIRSCHL, supra note 7; SHAPIRO 
& STONE SWEET, supra note 7; THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 7. 
 260. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 7 (analyzing role of domestic courts in domestic 
governance); STONE SWEET, supra note 197 (same); Dahl, supra note 7 (same). 
 261. See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 7 (analyzing role of European Court of Justice in 
European governance); Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, supra note 7 (analyzing global governance 
implications of World Trade Organization and European Court of Justice); COURTS CROSSING 
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 262. See Martinez, supra note 6 (describing emergence of an international legal 
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 263. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155 (2007); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. (2009). 
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